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The Money or the Media? Lessons from
Contrasting Developments in US and Australian
Whistleblowing Laws
Terry Morehead Dworkin
Indiana University; Seattle University, United States
A. J. Brown
Griffith University, Australia*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States and Australia were both leaders in passing laws
designed to protect whistleblowers and encourage whistleblowing.1 In the
United States, the modern whistleblowing protection movement was buoyed
by seminal events such as the explosion of the spaceship Challenger and the
Watergate break-in that led to the resignation of President Nixon, which
brought attention to the need for whistleblowing laws. In response to these
events, Congress enacted the federal Inspector General Act2 and the Civil
Service Reform Act (CSRA)3 in 1978 to protect whistleblowers and
encourage reporting of problems. In the 1980s, the focus of the US
*
We thank the Australian-American Fulbright Commission and Griffith University for
providing the grant funds that made this collaboration possible through Professor
Dworkin’s visit to Australia as a Fulbright Visiting Senior Specialist in July 2010.
1
“Whistleblowing” in this article is generally taken to mean disclosure by organization
members (former or current) of “illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices . . . under the
control of their employers to persons or organizations who may be able to affect action.”
Marcia Parmerlee Miceli & Janet P. Near, The Relationships Among Beliefs,
Organizational Position, and Whistle-Blowing Status: A Discriminant Analysis, 27
ACAD. MGMT. J. 687, 689 (1984). However, a variety of the statutes discussed herein,
while targeted to or especially important for whistleblowers, may arise via nonorganization-member complainants.
2
5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–12 (2008).
3
Civil Service Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
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whistleblower movement mainly shifted to the states;4 since the 1990s,
whistleblowing laws have been enacted in all fifty states, but public sector
law continued to be enacted at the federal level, with the passage of the
1989 Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA).5
At the same time, in Australia, legislative action regarding
whistleblowing law was triggered by the unraveling of systemic
government corruption in the state of Queensland through the Fitzgerald
Inquiry (1987–1989).6 By 1994, several Australian states had enacted
whistleblower protection or public interest disclosure acts, and a federal
parliamentary committee recommended similar action for the federal public
sector as well as the private sector nationally.7 The Australian states
followed the United States’ legislative approach relatively closely by
establishing public sector laws based on an “anti-retaliation” model of
whistleblower protection, albeit with the stronger adoption of an
“institutional” or “structural” model of protection.8
Today, whistleblowing law reform is again an active field in each
country. The reasons, whether direct or indirect, for this resurgence of
reform include the failure of the original anti-retaliation approach, to a
4

See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State
Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 105 (2000) [hereinafter Callahan &
Dworkin, Whistleblower Protection].
5
5 U.S.C. § 1201 (1989).
6
On the role of whistleblowing from the inception of Australia’s Fitzgerald Inquiry
through over two decades of progress, see generally AJ Brown, Restoring the Sunshine to
the Sunshine State: Priorities for Whistleblowing Law Reform in Queensland, 18
GRIFFITH L. REV. 666, 666–89 (2009) [hereinafter Brown, Sunshine].
7
SENATE SELECT COMM. ON PUB. INTEREST WHISTLEBLOWING, IN THE PUBLIC
INTEREST: REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INTEREST
WHISTLEBLOWING (1994), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/
Committees/Senate_Committees?url=history/uwb_ctte/pi/index.htm [hereinafter SENATE
SELECT COMM.].
8
See generally Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model to Encourage
Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107 (2006) [hereinafter Moberly,
Corporate Whistleblowers].
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significant degree in the United States and almost completely in Australia.
When law reform trends in each country are analyzed, however, recent
reform activity can be seen to stem not from systematic acknowledgement
of that failure, but rather from a resolve to try different alternative measures
with a greater degree of assumed effectiveness. In the United States, the
increased use of statutory reward or bounty mechanisms reflects the
perceived success of these measures, which encourage whistleblowing by
compensating aggrieved whistleblowers, so long as they are eligible. This
contrasts sharply with the approach taken in Australia, where there are no
rewards, and where, in addition to the institutional or structural model, law
reform has focused on legitimating whistleblowing to the media as a means
of inducing change.
This article analyzes this “second round” divergence of whistleblowing
reform to extract its lessons for whistleblowing law reform in each country.
Although the United States and Australia are post-colonial federations with
similar constitutional structures, significant differences between the
countries exist. A federal public sector whistleblowing regime has been
much slower to materialize in any form in Australia, and efforts toward
private sector whistleblowing regimes, even on the original anti-retaliation
model, have been even slower. Regardless, a comparison of the
whistleblowing laws of these two countries is helpful because it can help
lead to more successful protection of whistleblowers and encourage
reporting.
The first part of the article charts the development of whistleblowing
laws in the United States—and the movement toward rewards because of
the relative success of the federal False Claims Act (FCA) since its revision
in 1986—up to and including the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank). The second part charts the
development of Australian whistleblowing laws, up to and including new or
amended Public Interest Disclosure Acts in four Australian jurisdictions
between 2010 and 2012, as well as mooted federal reforms. The third part
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of this article identifies four distinct legislative models or approaches at
work through these aggregations of laws: anti-retaliation or organizational
justice; reward or bounty; institutional or structural; and public or media.
Measures that deploy these models, separately or in a mixture, provide
different types of incentives, both to whistleblowers and to organizational or
political responsiveness to whistleblowing.
In conclusion, we argue that, in Australia, the failure of the original antiretaliation approach, and the need to supplement the institutional/structural
approach, has led almost naturally to new attempts to try other approaches,
and we predict that the reward approach will also now be taken up. In the
United States, in light of the successful, but necessarily partial reach of the
reward model, we predict that the institutional/structural approach, long
pursued in Australia, is also likely to expand. This begs the question of
whether, when, and how each country is likely to return to the fundamental
problem of the substantial failure of the original anti-retaliation model. On
this score, the answer in each country is likely to be different, but the
objective remains the same. Overall, we argue that legislative efforts that
effectively integrate and reconcile all these different approaches provide the
most likely path to greater success in protecting whistleblowers and
encouraging whistleblowing.

II. THE MONEY? WHISTLEBLOWING LAW REFORM IN THE UNITED
STATES
A. The Anti-Retaliation Model and Its Evolution
Until the 1990s, legislative protection for whistleblowers consisted
primarily of protection from retaliation, including the possibility of
recovering wages and benefits, and jobs if they were lost due to
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whistleblowing.9 Legislators assumed that fear of retaliation prevented
observers of wrongdoing from reporting it and that barring retaliation would
encourage whistleblowing, prevent retaliation, and discourage wrongdoing.
While intuitively appealing, this has proven not to be the case.10 Indeed, the
approach has been spectacularly unsuccessful in protecting whistleblowers.
Most private-sector employees were employees at will;11 unless
whistleblowers could sue in tort for termination in violation of public policy
and recover punitive damages (not a widespread remedy at the time), the
protection was inadequate.12 What about public-sector employees?
1. The CSRA
In 1978, the CSRA was passed to protect public sector whistleblowers.13
Like all whistleblowing statutes, it banned retaliation, but it went further by
also trying to make it easier to report and to deal with the information
brought forward by whistleblowers. It presumed that if there was an
effective, identified channel to report problems, which was known to

9
Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich:
Financial Incentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273,
276 (1992) [hereinafter Callahan & Dworkin, Incentives].
10
MARCIA P. MICELI & JANET P. NEAR, BLOWING THE WHISTLE 175–78 (1992). Social
science studies indicate that factors such as open communication channels within
organizations, a well-defined and understood way to blow the whistle within an
organization, and belief that something will be done to correct the problem are more
influential. Id.
11
See ALFRED G. FELIU, INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 1 (2d ed. 1996). A private
employee at will is one who works without a timed contract and can be fired at any time
for any reason. Id. Public employees have some constitutional job security, and most
unionized employees (which are now around 10 percent of US employees) are protected
by a “just cause” contract clause. DAVID P. TWOMEY, LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW
580–81 (11th ed. 2001).
12
Terry Morehead Dworkin & Janet P. Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are They
Working?, 25 AM. BUS. L.J. 241 (1987).
13
See Civil Service Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
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employees, whistleblowing would be easier and more likely.14 In an attempt
to create this sort of channel, the CSRA created the Office of Special
Counsel (OSC) to receive and assess reports regarding alleged
governmental agency wrongdoing. If the OSC found a “substantial
likelihood” of agency wrongdoing, it required the agency to investigate and
give a report about its findings.15 The OSC then assessed the report and
submitted it to Congress and the President, as well as kept a file of it.16 It
was also supposed to act as an advocate for a whistleblower who suffered
retaliation. Despite numerous revisions, and attempted revisions such as the
passage of the WPA,17 this public sector anti-retaliation model, too, has
generally proved unsuccessful in spurring whistleblowing or protecting
whistleblowers.18 However, the recent passage of the Whistleblower
Protection Enhancement Act of 201219 and a more active OSC20 may lead to
greater success in the future.

14
Moberly, Corporate Whistleblowers, supra note 8, at 1131–32. The legislation was an
early model for what was later to be called the structural model of whistleblowing
legislation.
15
5 U.S.C. § 1206(b)(3)(A), repealed by Pub. L. No. 101-12, § 3(a)(8), 103 Stat. 16
(1989).
16
5 U.S.C. § 1206(b)(5)(A).
17
See 5 U.S.C. § 1201 (1989).
18
See, e.g., Press Release, Gov’t Accountability Project, Senate Approves
Whistleblower
Rights
Breakthrough
(June
23,
2006),
available
at
http://www.whistleblower.org/press/press-release-archive/2006/1290-senate-approveswhistleblower-rights-breakthrough (stating that the court had effectively gutted protection
for whistleblowers by refusing to protect them); Thomas M. Devine & Donald G. Alpin,
Abuse of Authority: The Office of the Special Counsel and Whistleblower Protection, 4
ANTIOCH L.J. 5, 25–26 (1986); Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1757, 1766–67 (2007); Rhonda McMillion, Aiding Whistle-Blowers,
A.B.A. J., Mar. 1989, at 121 (quoting Rep. Patricia Schroeder, the OSC “lost sight of its
mission”).
19
Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 Stat.
1465 (2012).
20
See infra note 263.
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2. Sarbanes-Oxley
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)21 is the most prominent of recent
anti-retaliation legislation. Among its provisions, it contains elements of the
structural model established by the CSRA (and discussed below).22 Like its
predecessors, it has not proved very successful.23 SOX was passed in
response to the wrongdoing, scandals, publicity and anger brought on by the
actions of leaders of failed corporations such as Enron and WorldCom.24
Whistleblowers were important in bringing the wrongdoing of these
corporate leaders to light.25 They also testified at hearings before Congress
about the law,26 and were intended to play a crucial role in SOX
enforcement. This represented an acknowledgement by the US Congress of
the importance of whistleblowing in the control, detection, and deterrence
of wrongdoing in the financial sector.

21

Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 800 (codified in
scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C.).
22
See Moberly, Corporate Whistleblowers, supra note 8.
23
See TOM DEVINE & TAREK F. MAASSARANI, THE CORPORATE WHISTLEBLOWER’S
SURVIVAL GUIDE 161–66 (2011).
24
See, e.g., SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMM. OF THE BOARD OF DIRS. OF ENRON,
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (2002), available at http://fl1.findlaw.com/news.find
law.com/wp/docs/enron/specinv020102rpt1.pdf; Lawrence A. Cunningham, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And it Just Might Work), 35
CONN. L. REV. 915, 924–25 (2003). Other companies that collapsed relatively soon
thereafter as a result of corporate greed include Global Crossing, Tyco, and Adelphia. Id.
25
See Corporations Must Disclose Ethics Codes, Information on Financial Experts, SEC
Says, 71 U.S.L.W. 2472 (Jan. 28, 2003). Indeed, of the three female whistleblowers
named “People of the Year,” by Time Magazine in 2002, two, Sherron Watkins and
Cynthia Cooper, blew the whistle on Enron and WorldCom, respectively. Richard Lacayo
& Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year 2002: The Whistleblowers, TIME (Dec. 30, 2002),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1003998,00.html. See also Michael
Orey, WorldCom-Inspired ‘Whistle-Blower’ Law Has Weaknesses, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1,
2002, at B1.
26
The Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002: Hearing on H.R. 4098
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 107–146 (2002); see also JOHN
BOSTELMAN, SARBANES OXLEY DESKBOOK 2–32 (2004). Some private companies
chose to comply because they considered it good business. Id.
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SOX applies to publicly-traded companies,27 covers mail, wire, bank, and
securities fraud, and requires companies to establish a code of ethics28 and
whistleblowing procedures.29 Employees who reasonably believe that their
information about a company concerns a covered violation have a right to
report without retaliation.30 Unlike most of the state and federal
whistleblowing statutes, SOX specifies different report recipients for
internal and external whistleblowing in order for the whistleblower to be
protected.31 It requires audit committees to establish company
whistleblowing procedures whereby employee whistleblowers can
anonymously submit issues of concern regarding questionable accounting
or auditing matters.32 Further, it requires the committees to have procedures
for retaining and treating the complaints. This structural model was seen as
an improvement over earlier attempts to encourage whistleblowing and
protect whistleblowers.33
SOX protects whistleblowers from retaliation, broadly defines
retaliation,34 and provides criminal penalties for retaliation.35 Nonetheless,
27
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301
(2010) (broadening the class of covered employees); see infra notes 124–35 and
accompanying text.
28
15 U.S.C. § 7263(a) (2010). The ethics code must apply to top corporate officers. Id.
29
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(A) (2010).
30
Virtually all state and federal whistleblowing legislation has similar reasonable belief
standards. See Callahan & Dworkin, Whistleblower Protection, supra note 4, at 120–22.
31
An internal report must go to someone with supervisory authority over the employee
or to someone working for the employer who has the authority to investigate, discover, or
terminate the wrongdoing. DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT,
WHISTLEBLOWING 161 (2d ed. 2004).
32
Jennifer Bjorhus, Sarbanes-Oxley Act Drives Demand for Whistle-Blower Hotline
Services, PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 12, 2004, at D1. Most commonly, the response to this
requirement has been for companies to contract with an independent hotline company to
receive the complaints. Id.
33
Moberly, Corporate Whistleblowers, supra note 8, at 1110–12.
34
18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2002). Retaliation is defined as “knowingly” taking “any action
harmful to any person, including interference with the lawful employment or livelihood
of any person.” Id.
35
Id. at § 1513(b).
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the many hundreds of SOX whistleblowers who have suffered retaliation
have few meaningful remedies. A few years after passage, studies of suits
brought by SOX whistleblowers who suffered retaliation highlighted the
Act’s failures.36 The lack of protection was particularly harmful because
employees believed they were protected,37 yet most had been fired.38 Of the
286 cases that went forward to an administrative law judge, only six (2
percent) resulted in a decision for the employee.39 Another study of over
seven hundred claims showed similar results40 and showed that an
employee’s probability of success decreased over time.41 In 2006, none of
the 159 cases that the hearing agency resolved resulted in a win for the

36

E.g., Beverly Earle & Gerald A. Madek, The Mirage of Whistleblower Protection
Under Sarbanes-Oxley: A Proposal for Change, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 20–21 (2007) “[T]he
number of cases settled . . . suggests that complainants are fighting an uphill battle.” Id.
One early study reported that through May of 2006, of the 677 completed SarbanesOxley retaliation complaints, 499 claims were dismissed, ninety-three claims settled, and
ninety-five were withdrawn. Id.
37
See id. at 17–18; Deborah Solomon, Risk Management: For Financial WhistleBlowers, New Shield is an Imperfect One; Claims of Employer Reprisal Go to OSHA
Investigators Unschooled in Accounting; A Fired CFO Lingers in Limbo, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 4, 2004, at A1.
38
82 percent had been fired. See Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An
Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 65, 132 (2007) [hereinafter Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations] (during the
first three years of whistleblower complaints, only 3.6 percent of the whistleblowers who
filed claims were successful in the administrative process, and only 6.5 percent on
appeal). Even if successful, the complainant often must wait a long time before receiving
anything. See Jayne O’Donnell, Blowing the Whistle Can Lead to Harsh Aftermath,
Despite Law, USA TODAY, Aug. 1, 2005, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/
workplace/2005-07-31-whistle-usat_x.htm?csp=34 (detailing the ordeal of David
Windhauser, the first employee ordered to be reinstated); Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares
Corp., 454 F. Supp. 2d 552 (W.D. Va. 2006).
39
Earle & Madek, supra note 36, at 22 (spanning from 2003 to May, 2006, there were
thirty-three settlements). Id. at 23.
40
Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 38(during the first three years of
whistleblower complaints, only 3.6 percent of the whistleblowers who filed claims were
successful in the administrative process, and only 6.5 percent on appeal).
41
Id. at 91.
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employee,42 and the subsequent results continued to be dismal.43 Few of the
decisions turned on the merits of the whistleblower’s retaliation claim.44
A detailed analysis of the failed claims showed a variety of reasons for
the failures, including procedural complexity, misinterpretations of the
statute’s burden of proof, interpretations that were as strict as possible
against the whistleblower, very short statute of limitations (i.e., thirty days
for an appeal), and others. As with the protection for public employees,
blame also lies with the Occupational Health and Safety Administration
(OSHA),45 the administrative agency designated to deal with complaints. It
lacked sufficient resources, which resulted, among other things, in some
whistleblowers not even being interviewed before a determination was
made on their claims. A study released in January 2009 by the US
42
Id. at 91 n.126 (citing an e-mail from Nilgun Tolek, Dir. of the OSHA Office of
Investigative Assistance, dated Oct. 3, 2006). OSHA’s fiscal year ended on September
30, 2006. Id. at 126. As of September 4, 2008, 1,273 SOX retaliation complaints had
been filed with the Department of Labor. See Terry Morehead Dworkin, US
Whistleblowing: A Decade of Progress?, in A GLOBAL APPROACH TO PUBLIC INTEREST
DISCLOSURE 40 (David B. Lewis ed., 2010). The Department found in favor of the
complainants in less than 2 percent of the retaliation claims. Id.
43
See Lawrence S. Moy, et al., Whistleblower Claims Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, in UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS OF 2010 (2010). Between 2002 and
summer 2008, 1,273 SOX complaints were filed with the Department of Labor. Id.
Jennifer Levitz, Whistleblowers Are Left Dangling: Technicality Leads Labor
Department to Dismiss Cases, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2008, http://onlinewsj.com/article/
SB122048878500197393.html?mod=googlenewsws_wsj (stating that of the 1,273 SOX
retaliation complaints filed, the department found in favor of the whistleblowers
seventeen times); Tracy Coenen, The Failure of Whistleblower Protection under
Sarbanes-Oxley, ALLBUSINESS, http://www.allbusiness.com/accounting/fraud/49691891.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2012) (reporting that roughly two-thirds of the claims were
dismissed).
44
See Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 38, at 69–70.
45
See Wendell H. Ford, Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, Pub.
L. No. 106-181, 114 Stat. 61 (2000) (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
Whistleblowers who suffer retaliation must file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor
who then refers it to OSHA for investigation. 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(1). An administrative
law judge hears the evidence resulting from the investigation and renders a decision. Id.
The decision can be appealed to the Administrative Review Board of the Department of
Labor. Secretary’s Order 5-2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 65008 (Oct. 22, 2002).
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Government Accountability Office (GAO)46 added substance to this
finding.47 Although Congress designated OSHA to handle SOX
whistleblower complaints, it did not give the already overstretched agency
any additional funding.48 Since SOX complaints comprise approximately 13
percent of whistleblower claims received by OSHA,49 the SOX additions
put a severe strain on OSHA’s resources, especially since OSHA employees
had no experience dealing with the law.50 This was complicated further by a
lack of information about what the agency was doing.51
The GAO study found numerous deficiencies; for example, OSHA did
not accurately keep its data and key dates were often inaccurately
recorded,52 despite the fact that the laws mandate time limits for OSHA
determinations (which were seldom met).53 One contributing factor was the
lack of basic tools for investigators, such as laptops and cell phones, to use

46

The GAO did the study because it recognized that, “[w]orkers who ‘blow the whistle’
on prohibited practices play a role in enforcing federal laws,” but they face reprisals. U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION PROGRAM: BETTER
DATA AND IMPROVED OVERSIGHT WOULD HELP ENSURE PROGRAM QUALITY AND
CONSISTENCY (Jan. 2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09106.pdf
[hereinafter USGAO].
47
Id. It also found that whistleblowers received a favorable outcome in 21 percent of the
complaints. Id.
48
The agency was already overstretched because it dealt with whistleblower complaints
based on sixteen other laws, from environmental laws to travel safety laws to
employment safety law. Id. at 1.
49
See Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 38, at 125.
50
See USGAO, supra note 46, at 8, for a list of the included laws.
51
The GAO examined what was known about complaint processing times and what
affected those times, what outcomes resulted, and the challenges OSHA faced in
administering the program. Id. at 3.
52
Id. at 15–18. Indeed, in one regional office none of the case-closed dates matched the
files. Id. at 15.
53
Id. at 17. OSHA has thirty to ninety days to complete its investigation and make an
initial finding, depending on which of the fourteen statutes under which the
whistleblower is seeking protection. Id.
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in the field while investigating complaints.54
A practical problem of SOX is the lack of an explicit provision55 in the
law that allowed for the full range of damages for a whistleblower,
including punitive damages or a reward structure, which would help offset
the full costs of retaliation.56 This deterred lawyers from taking
whistleblowers’ cases on a contingency basis. It also failed to lead to the
growth of a specialized bar made up of lawyers specializing in
whistleblower claims. The development of a specialized bar was important
to the success of the revised FCA, which has been the most successful spur
for whistleblowing so far.57 Several writers called for the provisions of
significant rewards to make the law more effective.58
Dodd-Frank59 was designed to remedy some of the flaws in SOX. DoddFrank makes SOX more whistleblower-friendly by providing for the right to
54
Id. at 37. Based on these findings, the GAO’s recommendations went to some basic
steps such as keeping accurate information and providing training and equipment, rather
than more substantive reforms of the program. Id. at 42.
55
SOX specifies that a whistleblower who successfully proves retaliation is entitled to
“all relief necessary to make the employee whole.” 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(1). This
includes reinstatement, back pay and benefits, special damages such as attorneys’ and
expert witness fees, and litigation costs. Id. at § 1514A(c)(2). While the language “all
relief necessary” can be interpreted to allow for additional damages. See, e.g., Kalkunte
v. DVI Financial Services, Inc., No. 2004-SOX-00056, 2005 WL 4889006, at *61 (U.S.
Dep’t of Labor SAROX July 18, 2005) (front pay); Murray v. TXU Corp., No. 3:03-CV0888-P, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10298 (N.D. Tex. May 27, 2005); MICHAEL DELIKAT,
CORPORATE WHISTLEBLOWING IN THE SARBANES-OXLEY/DODD-FRANK ERA § 6:1.1
(2006); see also Hanna v. WCI Cmtys., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (S.D. Fla. 2004)
(damage to reputation). Most courts do not follow such an interpretation).
56
Indeed, Congress removed punitive damages language from the final version of the
bill. See Murray v. TXU Corp., No. 3:03-CV-0888-P, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10945, at
*13 (N.D. Tex. June 7, 2005).
57
See Callahan & Dworkin, Incentives, supra note 9, at 282–83, 326.
58
See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3–5, 27–8 (2002);
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for SarbanesOxley Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 91 (2007);
Dworkin, supra note 18, at 1773.
59
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5567
(2010).
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a jury trial,60 precluding enforcement of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
agreements,61 lengthening the statute of limitations,62 and broadening the
class of covered employers.63 However, because of its even broader
application and rewards, Dodd-Frank may eclipse the use of SOX in the
future.
B. The Reward Model
1. The US FCA and Its Progeny
The success of the revised FCA64 in recovering money for the
government and for whistleblowers has led to a reward system dominating
US whistleblower legislation today. The FCA was originally passed during
the Civil War, when government procurement increased rapidly and the
government did not have the resources to adequately monitor contractors or
screen for quality.65 In order to deter fraudulent activities, Congress
borrowed an idea from England and passed qui tam legislation designed to
turn ordinary citizens into private attorneys-general to act on behalf of the
government.66 If citizens discovered fraud involving government funds,
whistleblowers called “relators,” were authorized to file a claim on behalf of

60

Id. § 922(c)(1)(B) amending 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.
Id. § 922(c)(2).
62
Id. § 922(c)(1)(A)(i). The limitations period is extended to 180 days (from ninety
days) to file a complaint. Id.
63
Id. § 929A. Expanding “covered employers” to include any “subsidiary or affiliate
whose financial information is included in the consolidated financial statements of such
company.” Id. Additionally, employees of “nationally-recognized statistical rating
organizations” (generally assumed to be credit rating agencies, among others) are now
covered. Id. § 922(b)(1). Dodd-Frank also amends the FCA to strengthen protections for
whistleblowers.
64
See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1988).
65
For example, the government was sold sawdust as gunpowder. Callahan & Dworkin,
Incentives, supra note 9, at 302 n.112.
66
Id. at 302.
61
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the government and they received a reward for their trouble.67
The FCA was variously effective over the years, but a century later, for
several reasons,68 it had fallen into disuse and only a handful of claims were
being filed annually. Federal contract fraud continued to be a problem, and
to address it, Congress significantly revised the FCA in 1986.69 Congress
also instituted other reward provisions in the late 1980s and early 1990s
regarding limited kinds of governmental wrongdoing,70 but the rewards
were discretionary and the amounts were relatively small. It is the large
rewards under the FCA that have become the primary characteristic of
revised and new whistleblowing legislation. While all whistleblowing
statutes still bar retaliation, FCA-style rewards have become the drivers of
reports of wrongdoing by whistleblowers, and recovery of funds by the
government.71
Use of the FCA exploded after revision because of several beneficial
changes, including increased certainty, size of rewards,72 and extension of
the statute of limitations. Within three years, the number of claims increased

67

Id. Unlike most whistleblowing legislation, the relator does not need to be an
employee. Id. However, most realtors gain their information by being an organizational
member with reluctant access to insider information. See MARCIA P. MICELI ET AL.,
WHISTLE-BLOWING IN ORGANIZATIONS 6, 34 (2008).
68
Callahan & Dworkin, Whistleblower Protection, supra note 4, at 123 n.112.
69
See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (1988).
70
See, e.g., Financial Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, 12 U.S.C. §
1831k (1990) (authorizing federal banking agencies to pay rewards for original
information that leads to recoveries over $50 thousand); Insider Trading and Securities
Enforcement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1988) (authorizing the Securities and Exchange
Commission to offer rewards of up to 10 percent of the penalty imposed for civil insider
trading penalties).
71
See MICELI, ET AL. supra note 67, at 164–65 (2008).
72
Congress raised the possible recovery to treble the amount of the fraud and raised the
possible fine per incident to $10,000 from $2,000, with thousands of claims possible in a
single suit. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a); see Fred Strasser, When the Big Whistle Blows . . . ,
NAT’L L. J., May 8, 1989, at 1, 43.
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twenty-fold,73 and claims today are in the hundreds.74 The successful
whistleblower gets up to 30 percent of the recovery of treble the fraud, plus
the fines (which can be $10,000 per incident with the possibility that there
may be hundreds of incidents in a suit). Since fraud in the health care and
defense industries alone runs into the billions of dollars,75 the whistleblower
almost always receives over a million dollars, and often much more.76 In
fiscal year 2010, the government recouped $3 billion from civil cases alone
in suits alleging fraud, an increase of 25 percent from the previous year.77
Thus, the government and the whistleblower gain significantly from the
FCA, as does, ultimately, the taxpayer. A recent study by the University of
Chicago and Toronto University showed that in industries covered by the
FCA, employees were substantially more likely to bring forth evidence of

73

Rick Wartzman & Paul M. Barrett, For Whistle-Blowers, Tune May Change, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 27, 1989, at 1.
74
See Fraud Statistics – Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 7, 2011),
http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf.
75
MICELI ET AL., supra note 67, at 164. An example of continuing large awards in the
medical industry is illustrated by the October 2010 FCA claim settlement by
GlaxcoSmithKline PLC for $750 million. Peter Loftus, Whistleblower’s Long Journey,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2010, at B1. The whistleblower received $96 million. Id. Graft
from the Iraq war and reconstruction is a current source of lawsuits. See Joel Millman,
The Hunt for Weapons of Mass Corruption, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2011, at A6.
Encouraging off-label use of products by the manufacturers is an increasing source of
such claims. Id. Two other cases of improper marketing in 2009 were settled for $2.3
billion and $1.4 billion. Id.; see also Peter Loftus, Johnson & Johnson Ordered to Pay
$327 Million, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/
S B10001424052702303745304576364621661093868.html.
76
See, e.g., Warren P. Strobel & Marisa Taylor, $69.3 Million Afghan-Contracting Fine
May Be a Record, MCCLATCHY (Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/11/
05/103300/693-million-afghan-contracting.html#storylink=misearch; Andy Pasztor,
Northrop Agrees to Pay $325 Million to Settle Suit, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2009, at B1.
However, when taxes and attorneys’ fees are paid, the net is less. Additionally, individual
reward is diminished when cases involve multiple whistleblowers.
77
Evan Perez, U.S. News: Lawsuits Bring in $3 Billion for U.S., WALL ST. J., Nov. 23,
2010, at A4.
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major frauds than in those areas not covered.78
When large rewards first began to be issued, many questioned the ethics
and propriety of such payments, as well as whether they would lead to
meritless claims.79 The latter has been less problematic. There is little
incentive to bring a meritless claim because the whistleblower can only
recover if she or he bases the claim on information that the government
does not have,80 and it leads to a recovery for the government. Additionally,
it would be difficult to find a lawyer willing to represent the whistleblower
if the information is unlikely to lead to a recovery, since many of these
cases are taken on a contingency basis. The concern that whistleblowers
might be motivated by gain rather than a desire to help is also no longer a
major ethical consideration. The desire by the government to recover money
and correct wrongdoing now trumps concerns regarding whistleblower
motive. A “pure” motive is seen as secondary to the public good created by
whistleblowers,81 regardless of motive.
As the size of the reward is directly related to the magnitude of the fraud,
it is proportional to the wrongdoer’s action, as well as beneficial to the
government.82 The rewards are also seen as a way to stop wrongdoing,
while also giving the whistleblower sufficient monetary protection for the
risk of a lost job, lack of a future in the organization or even the profession,
and other possible consequences of whistleblowing.83 A reasonable belief
78

Alexander Dyck, et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?, 65 J. FIN. 2213,
2215 (2010).
79
See, e.g., Callahan & Dworkin, Incentives, supra note 9, at 318–36; Elkan
Abramowitz, Mutiny for the Bounty—Qui Tam: Bonanza or Fair Reward, N.Y.L.J., May
1, 1990, at 3; Michael Waldman, Time to Blow the Whistle?, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 25, 1991,
at 13.
80
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2012). See infra notes 130–34 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the latest developments regarding the bar to basing a suit on previously
disclosed information.
81
See Callahan & Dworkin, Incentives, supra note 9, at 319.
82
Id. at 327.
83
For a more thorough discussion of the issues, see id. at 318–36.
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standard prevents rash claimants from profiting and can result in monetary
costs to the meritless claimant.84 While the trend is now to limit the rewards
to recoveries from significant wrongdoing, the question of propriety has
been settled.
State legislators, in a time of financial need, took notice of the success of
the federal government’s recoveries and started passing their own FCA
legislation.85 The state FCA statutes have proved to be as successful as the
federal law in generating reports and recoveries.86 The range of statutory
recovery allowed varies by state, with some more generous than the federal
law.87
More states were encouraged to pass targeted FCA-type legislation by the
passage of the 2006 Deficit Reduction Act, which was enacted to help
combat Medicaid fraud.88 The federal government pays 60 percent of
Medicaid expenses, and the states shoulder 40 percent. This costs the
federal government billions annually, and fraud is considered significant,89

84
31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(4). If a claim is clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought
primarily for purposes of harassment, the judge can award the defendant reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs. Id.
85
See MICELI, ET AL., supra note 67, Appendix. Before 1992, only three states provided
for the possibility of a statutory reward, and the amounts were insignificant in relation to
the retaliation suffered. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 659.530 (1991) (possible award of
$50); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-27-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991) (25 percent of savings
resulting from the whistleblowing in the first year, up to a limit of $2,000); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 230.83(2) (West 1987) (government can offer a reward for information to
improve state administration or operations).
86
See MICELI ET AL., supra note 67, 177–81. It is recommended that states give the
relator at least 15 percent of the state’s recovery. Id. at 166.
87
Id. at 167. Nevada, for example, allows up to 50 percent of the recovery to go to the
whistleblower. Id. at 165.
88
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (2005). The law also requires that
health care providers provide education programs on fraud and how to file false claims
complaints. Id.
89
MICELI ET AL., supra note 67, at 166.
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so Congress was particularly interested in encouraging whistleblowing.90
States can recover even more than 40 percent of money recovered as a
result of information received from a whistleblower if they enact laws that
follow the federal reward model, and several have done so.91
2. Tax Fraud
A reward system for reporting tax cheats has long been in existence, but
like the FCA before revisions, it was not very effective.92 As in the FCA,
anyone with information about tax fraud could report and put a claim in for
a reward.93 Rewards were at the discretion of the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) (which lost the reward amount from its revenue), and were seldom
given or long-delayed.94 In an attempt to increase revenue, Congress urged
the IRS to revise the policy to increase the incentives to report, noting that
the gap between what was owed and actual tax payments was about $290
billion annually.95 Several revisions similar to, but not as good as, the FCA
were adopted in 2006.96 These revisions include giving whistleblowers
more certain awards and information, and allowing them greater
participation in the process. A whistleblower office within the agency was
created.97
Significantly, whistleblowers can now recover 15 to 30 percent of the

90

Jon Gibeaut, Seeking the Cure: With Health Care Fraud Rampant, States Are Urged
to Pass Their Own False Claims Act, but Foes Warn of Windfalls for Plaintiffs Lawyers,
92 OCT A.B.A. J. 44 (2006).
91
MICELI ET AL., supra note 67, at 166, 177–81.
92
Jean Eagleshaw & Ashby Jones, Whistleblower Bounties Pose Challenges, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 13, 2010, at C1 (quoting Dean Zerbe, Special Counsel at the National
Whistleblower Center).
93
See MICELI ET AL., supra note 67, at 164.
94
Id.
95
Tom Herman, IRS Reworks Its Whistle-Blower Program; Tax Agency Is Criticized for
Inconsistency in Paying Rewards, Lax Management, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2006, at D1.
96
Tax Relief and Health Care Act 2006, 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
97
See 26 U.S.C. § 7623. The office is designed to receive and investigate complaints. Id.
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proceeds from actions to recover more than $2 million, or from actions to
recover from taxpayers with annual gross incomes of more than $200,000.98
Similar to what happened after the FCA revisions, reporting of significant
tax fraud increased after the revisions.99 Before, the IRS only received “a
handful of legitimate claims” annually.100 In fiscal years 2008 and 2009, the
IRS received hundreds of reports of underpayments of $10 million, and
dozens reporting underpayments of $100 million or more.101 In fiscal year
2010, the IRS received 460 claims that appeared to meet the reward
guidelines.102
An intended advantage of the revisions was quicker payment of awards.
However, speed in this context is relative. Despite the revisions in 2006, the
first payout was not made until April 2011, and this happened only after the
whistleblower hired an attorney to move his claim through the IRS.103 Four
years after seeking recovery, he finally received an award of $4.5 million.104
The award was widely reported, and it was hoped that raised awareness

98
Id. The amount awarded depends on “the extent to which the individual substantially
contributed to such action.” Id. “This law is not designed to snag the guppies, but to
harpoon the whales.” MaryClaire Dale, Associated Press, IRS Awards $4.5M to
Whistleblower, USA TODAY, Apr. 8, 2011, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/perfi/
taxes/2011-04-08-irs-whistleblower-taxes-reward.htm (quoting Patrick Burns of the
nonprofit Taxpayers Against Fraud).
99
Herman, supra note 95, at D3.
100
Eagleshaw & Jones, supra note 92.
101
MaryClaire Dale, Associated Press, Nice Motive to ‘Squeal’: IRS Awards $4.5 Million,
SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 9, 2011, at A1 [hereinafter Dale, Nice Motive to ‘Squeal’].
102
Ashby Jones, Accountant Gets Whistleblower Payout, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704415104576250870321773348.html.
The IRS received 5,678 tips during this period. Id. A large number of the tips involve exspouses or mom-and-pop businesses. Dale, Nice Motive to ‘Squeal,’ supra note 101.
103
Dale, Nice Motive to ‘Squeal,’ supra note 101, at A1. The whistleblower, an
accountant, discovered that his employer, a Fortune 500 company, had a tax liability of
over $20 million and reported it to the employer. Id. When the company refused to report
it to the IRS, he gave the agency the information. Id.
104
Id. The IRS withheld taxes before sending the check, so he actually received $3.24
million. Id.
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would further increase reporting.105 Subsequently, the IRS adopted a new
policy that it will not pay awards until the two-year period for taxpayers to
appeal their payments has expired.106 The slowness in payment may well
make it more difficult for whistleblowers to find an attorney to represent
them and reduce their willingness to report.107
3. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
Dodd-Frank was passed after the financial crisis of 2008.108 After the
financial crisis, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) used the
bounty structures and experiences of the IRS, the FCA successes, and the
SOX experiences to benchmark its past performance under its limited
bounty program and make recommendations regarding its expanded role in
encouraging whistleblowing under Dodd-Frank.109 Although rulemaking
under the new law is ongoing, the reward structure is in place, and analysis
and predictions based on the IRS and FCA history is possible.110
105

Id. “It ought to encourage a lot of other people to squeal.” (quoting Senator Charles
Grassley, who helped get the IRS whistleblower office authorized in 2006). Id. However,
the delay in recovery may also have a negative impact. Id. There have been several
criticisms, explanations, and excuses offered about the delay. Id. Senator Grassley said
the delay may be due, in part, to the fact that the IRS may fear embarrassment for missing
$20 million underpayments. Id. The IRS said a routine audit was already under way in
the case, but the accountant’s information pointed out a new question. Id. The Treasury
Department’s Inspector General for Tax Administration found that the Agency suffered
from “deficiencies” in the “control and timely resolution of whistleblower claims.”
Eagleshaw & Jones, supra note 92, at C1.
106
Dale, Nice Motive to ‘Squeal,’ supra note 101.
107
See Callahan & Dworkin, Incentives, supra note 9, at 315–16.
108
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301
(2010)).
109
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ASSESSMENT OF THE SEC’S BOUNTY PROGRAM iii
(Mar. 29, 2010), available at http://www.sec-oig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/2010/
474.pdf. It also benchmarked against the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. Id.
110
Yin Wilczek, Final Whistleblower Program Will Mirror SEC Proposal; Will Be Hurt
by Budget Needs, 43 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 102 (2011). It should be noted that in addition
to conflict created by the lobbying on behalf of business interests versus employee and
whistleblower advocates about the rules and regulations, there is conflict between
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Another spur to Dodd-Frank and its reward structure was the failure of
the SEC to act on a multi-billion dollar fraud case, reported to it over
several years.111 New York money manager Bernard Madoff ran a Ponzi
scheme112 that lasted for decades.113 The fallout from this scheme was
“massive and . . . rocked Wall Street,”114 which was already suffering from
the financial crisis.115 After the Madoff affair was revealed, several more
Ponzi schemes came to light, but none had as significant an impact.116 The
Republicans and Democrats regarding this law. Id. There is a “stark divide” between the
views of corporations and whistleblowers, and that is reflected in Congress itself “where
there are fairly wide gaps between liberals and conservatives.” Id. (quoting Lawrence
West, former associate director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division and now a partner in
Latham & Watkins LLC).
111
Kara Scannell et al., Crisis on Wall Street: Markopolos Testifies Fairfield Knew Little
About Madoff, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2009, at C2. The whistleblower, Harry Markopolos,
persistently went to the SEC with information, and even offered to conduct an undercover
operation for the agency, but he was rebuffed. Id. Madoff was convicted in the criminal
case against him and is in prison for life. See James Heller & Joanna Chung, Life After
Madoff’s ‘Big Lie’, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11–2, 2010, at A1.
112
Dionne Searcey, Post-Madoff, a Support Network: Victims of Alleged Ponzi Scheme
Find Comfort Through Shared Hardship, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2009, at C3. It is the
biggest Ponzi scheme in history involving at least $50 billion. Id. Investors in the scheme
may number in the thousands. Marcy Gordon, Associated Press, SEC, Madoff to Settle
Civil Suit, SEATTLE P-I, Feb. 10, 2009, at C7.
113
Gordon, supra note 112. It officially came to light in December 2008, when Madoff’s
sons turned him in a day after he confessed to them. Id.
114
Id. The fallout continues three years later. See, e.g., Chad Bray & Michael Rothfield,
The Madoff Fraud: Peter Madoff Pleads Guilty, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2012, at B1
(stating that Peter Madoff, brother of Bernard Madoff, submitted his guilty plea three
years to the day after his brother was sentenced to 150 years in prison); Chad Bray,
Money Manager Settles Madoff-Related Case, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2012, at C1; Chad
Bray, The Madoff Fraud: Sixth Guilty Plea in Scheme, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2011, at C3.
It has had victims worldwide, and there are battles over reclaiming funds and
compensating victims. See Reed Albergotti, The Madoff Fraud: Amid Battles, Trustee
Seeks $2 Billion Payout, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2012, at C1.
115
Michael Rothfeld, Madoff Claims Lure Banks, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2011, at
A1.There are numerous lawsuits against different entities from Madoff’s victims and the
court appointed trustee who is trying to reclaim funds for the victims. Id. “[S]orting out
the huge Madoff fraud claims has become a mini-industry . . . .” Id.
116
Steve Stecklow, In Echoes of Madoff, Ponzi Cases Proliferate, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28,
2009, at A1; Yuka Hayashi, Japan Police Target Alleged Ponzi Scheme, WALL ST. J.,
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Madoff whistleblower that attempted to alert the SEC called the agency
“both a captive regulator and a failed regulator,” and some of the
congresspersons on the committee investigating the SEC’s failure agreed.117
The Madoff whistleblower recommended that the SEC set up a unit to
receive tips in a manner similar to the unit implemented by the IRS.118 In
light of the failure of SOX, the government decided that increased oversight
and regulation was necessary,119 and that rewards would play a role in
inducing whistleblowing and better protecting the whistleblower.120
Dodd-Frank is broader than SOX in terms of what types of
whistleblowing will be protected,121 who is protected,122 and the types of

Feb. 6, 2009, at A6. Following these, an alleged $8 billion fraud scheme run by Allen
Stanford was revealed due to closer inspection because of the Madoff fraud. Glenn R.
Simpson et al., The Stanford Affair: Madoff Case Led SEC to Intensify Stanford Probe,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2009, at A14. Like Madoff, allegations had “dogged R. Allen
Stanford” for years, but the agencies failed to act effectively. Id. One accused Ponziist,
Guy Albert de Chimay, built trust with his clients by claiming he managed $200 million
(false) for his royal relatives (true) in Belgium. Michael Rothfeld, Famous Name Is
Charged, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2010, at B1. He allegedly defrauded them of $7 million.
Id. Kenneth Starr, a financial advisor who allegedly defrauded clients out of $59 million,
pleaded guilty in September 2010, to securities fraud among many other counts. Chad
Bray, Investment Advisor to Stars Kenneth Starr Pleads Guilty, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11,
2010, at B1.
117
Gregory Zuckerman & David Gauthier-Villars, The Madoff Fraud Case: A Lonely
Lament From a Whistle-Blower, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2009, at C3. He also said that he
did not press his charges even harder because he feared retribution from the powerful
Madoff. Id. Others who questioned Madoff’s performance numbers failed to come
forward at all. Aaron Lucchetti, The Madoff Fraud Case: On Street, Reluctance to Blow
the Whistle, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2009, at C4.
118
Zuckerman & Gauthier-Villars, supra note 117. .
119
Obama Lists Key Principles for Reform Of Nation’s Financial Regulatory System, 77
U.S.L.W. 2517 (2009). “To rebuild trust in our markets, we must redouble our efforts to
promote openness, transparency and plain language throughout our financial system.” Id.;
Elizabeth Williamson & Melanie Trottman, The Obama Budget: Federal Workers,
Regulations to Increase, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2009, at A4; Damian Paletta, Bernanke
Calls for Broader Regulations, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2009, at A4.
120
Deborah L. Cohen, Wetting Their Whistles, 97-MAR A.B.A. J. 14 (2011).
121
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301
(2010). One court has held that included within the protection is an internal complaint
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protection.123 Like all whistleblowing laws, retaliation is barred.124
Importantly, it contains a reward provision to encourage whistleblowers to
report financial wrongdoing of those involved in transactions in public
markets.125 Similar to the FCA, a whistleblower that comes forward with
new information about wrongdoing may receive 10 to 30 percent126 of what
the government recovers from civil or criminal actions, with a jurisdictional
limitation that recovery must yield $1 million or more.127 This limit is
about a violation. Egan v. Tradingscreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202(LBS), 2011 WL
1672066 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011).
122
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 12 U.S.C. §
5567 (2010). The law protects whistleblowing employees of organizations and people
that provide financial services to consumers. Id. § 5567(b). This is expansively defined.
Id. The coverage can be expanded by the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. Id. §
5492(a)(1).
123
Id. § 5567(c). The whistleblower must submit a charge to the Department of Labor
(DOL) within 180 days of the alleged retaliation. Id. § 5567(c)(1)(A). If the DOL finds
probable cause, it must order preliminary relief. Id. § 5567(c)(2)(B). This can include
reinstatement and back pay. Id. § 5567(c)(4)(B). Included in an award can be
“compensatory damages,” but this is undefined. Id. Either party can seek review of the
Secretary of Labor’s order in the Circuit Court of Appeals in the district where the
whistleblower lived at the time of the alleged violation. Id. § 5567(c)(4)(E).
Whistleblowers can report anonymously if represented by counsel, but must reveal their
identity before collecting the award. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2010).
124
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h). Retaliation is broadly defined. Id.
125
Id. § 78u-6. The section amends the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78a et seq.), creating the new § 21E. Id. § 78u-6(a). The entities include investment banks
and broker-dealers as well as public companies. Id. Generally, claims must be brought
within six years of the date of the violation. Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii).
126
Id. § 78u-6(b)(1)(A)(B). The amount of the award is at the discretion of the
Commission considering the significance of the information to the success of the
recovery, the degree of assistance provided by the whistleblower or his or her legal
representative, the “programmatic interest of the Commission in deterring violations of
the securities laws by making awards to whistleblowers,” and “such additional relevant
factors” the Commission may establish by rule or regulation. Id. § 78u-6(c)(1)(B)(i)(III).
Specifically excluded from being considered by the Commission is the balance of the
Fund. Id. § 78u-6(c)(1)(B)(ii).
Id. § 78u-6(a)(1). The news media is specifically mentioned a source that the
whistleblower cannot exclusively rely on. Id. § 78u-6(a)(3)(C). The information must be
voluntarily provided. Id. § 78u-6(b)(1).
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similar to that imposed by the IRS, but unlike the FCA, which has no
amount jurisdictional limit.
Several additional limitations exist on recovery, however. In order to
collect, the information provided by the whistleblower must be based on
information not already known to the SEC or taken exclusively from public
sources.128 Specifically excluded from recovering are members, officers, or
employees of “an appropriate regulatory agency,” the Department of
Justice, a self-regulatory organization, the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, or a law enforcement organization.129 Additionally, a
whistleblower that is convicted of a criminal violation related to judicial or
administrative action cannot recover, unlike in the FCA, which allows for
possible recovery.130 And unlike the IRS auditor-whistleblower scenario
discussed above, a whistleblower gaining information through an audit of
financial statements required under securities laws is limited in recovery.131
Finally, a whistleblower that fails to submit information in the form
required by the SEC cannot collect.132
As these limitations illustrate, one of the trends in the evolution of federal
whistleblower reward laws is to circumscribe who can recover and how
rewards can be obtained.133 In part, this trend is due to significant lobbying
by business interests.134 It was reflected in the effort to add more limitations
128

Id. § 78u-6(a)(3). In an important change from previous whistleblower laws, original
information can be based on a whistleblower’s original analysis, not just evidence of
wrongdoing. Id. § 78u-6(a)(3)(A).
129
Id. § 78u-6(c)(2)(A)(i-v).
130
Id. § 78u-6(c)(2)(B).
131
Id. § 78u-6(c)(2)(C). The auditor cannot recover if submission of the information
would violate the requirements of § 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id.
132
Id. § 78u-6(c)(2)(D).
133
Gregory F. Parisi, A World of Whistleblowers: What Companies Should Know About
Dealing with Third Parties Going Forward, 80 U.S.L.W. 863 (2012). However, unlike
other laws, the eligibility for an award has global application. Id.
134
See, e.g., Jessica Holzer, SEC Urged to Revise ‘Whistleblower’ Plan, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 17, 2011, at C2. More than 260 firms told the SEC that the reward plan would turn
financial fraud into a gold mine for employees. Jean Eagleshaw, Firms Assail
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through restrictive rules and regulations,135 and efforts to block President
Obama for an extended period from appointing the head of the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau.136 Despite the lobbying against the reward
system and Republican threats to cut funding, the SEC, in a three-two vote
on May 25, 2011, passed a rule giving employees the right to report
wrongdoing directly to the SEC without first reporting to a company’s
compliance program.137 SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro said the rule was
intended to “break the silence of those who see a wrong.”138 It is also seen
as a tool to help deter wrongdoing.139 The rule was revised, though, so that
if employees report internally (as most employees do) and the company
informs the SEC about the violation, the employees can still get an award,
as they could if they report internally and then to the SEC within 120

Whistleblowers Plan by SEC, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2010; Eagleshaw & Jones, supra
note 92, at C1. The Dodd-Frank law is so broad that is has already produced more than
three million words in the Federal Register, and about 62 percent of the 387 sets of rules
hadn’t been proposed as of the end of April 2011. Jean Eagleshaw, Overhaul Grows and
Slows, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2011, at C1. Indeed, no agency met any of the 26 DoddFrank-related April deadlines. Id.
135
See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 120, at 14–15; Wilczek, supra note 110; Eagleshaw &
Jones, supra note 92; Deborah Solomon & Jamila Trindle, New Financial Rules Delayed,
WALL ST. J., June 15, 2011, at A1. This applies mainly to rule about derivatives. Id.
136
Deborah Solomon, Consumer Agency Stymied by GOP, WALL ST. J., May 6, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704810504576305553238068870.html.
The Republicans want the agency restructured before they will approve an appointment.
Id. Many business groups oppose the agency. Id. The lobbying about Dodd-Frank
continues. See Jessica Holzer & Andrew Ackerman, SEC Addressing Gaps in Analysis,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052702304818404577348101006567024.html.
137
Allen Smith, SEC Approves Final Whistle-Blowing Rule, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RES.
MGMT, http://www.shrm.org/LegalIssues/FederalResources/Pages/
SECWhistleBlowing Rule.aspx (last visited Oct. 21, 2012).
138
David Hilzenrath, SEC Rule Rewards Those Who Detect Fraud, SEATTLE TIMES, May
26, 2011, at A14 (quoting the Washington Post). The vote was split along party lines with
Democrats voting for the rule. Id.
139
Id.
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days.140
The Dodd-Frank reward structure is seen as a bellwether for the other
rules and regulations that will follow,141 notwithstanding the fears that a
lack of resources142 and other limits could hamper its effectiveness, as was
the case with SOX, OSHA, and the IRS.143 As what happened with the FCA
and IRS revised reward laws, Dodd-Frank has generated a large number of
claims. Claims began to come in before the law was passed in July 2010,
and the SEC forecast at that time it would receive thirty thousand tips a
year.144 The SEC said it has already received hundreds of tips because of the
law,145 and many of them are “high quality.”146
Dodd-Frank also created a similar reward system under the Commodity
Exchange Act.147 The rewards are for information provided to Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). As with the Madoff scandal, the
CFTC recently failed to detect significant fraud before the financial crisis,
140
Smith, supra note 137. Internal reporting could also increase the amount of the award
the whistleblower receives. Id.
141
Hilzenrath, supra note 138.
142
Wilczek, supra note 110. Since the Republicans are in control of the House, getting
sufficient resources could be a struggle. Id. The enforcement program was allegedly
underfunded for many years prior to Dodd-Frank. Id. The law called for an increase of 18
percent to the SEC’s budget. Id. In April, a deal was reached to provide adequate funding
through September 2011. Suzanne Barlyn, SEC, CFTC Win Increases in Funding in
Budget Deal, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001 424052748703518704576258840642909826.html. What happens next depends
in part on the election results of 2012.
143
Eagleshaw & Jones, supra note 92, at C1.
144
Id.
145
See Jessica Holzer & Fawn Johnson, Larger Bounties Spur Surge in Fraud Tips,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2010, at C3; Wilczek, supra note 110. A plaintiff’s firm said calls
from potential whistleblowers had gone up tenfold. Id. It also said that they had “been
judicious” about passing information to the SEC because they wanted to review them and
make sure the SEC was going to take them seriously. Id.
146
Hilzenrath, supra note 138, at A16 (quoting Robert Khuzami, an SEC enforcement
official).
147
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5301
(2010).
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despite agency examinations.148
C. The Structural Dimension
As already noted, a variety of US provisions are not limited simply to
anti-retaliation measures and reward mechanisms, but have progressively
included elements of a “structural” or institutional model of whistleblowing
legislation.149 The broad intention is to require or induce the establishment
of institutional mechanisms by which organizations take it on themselves to
encourage internal whistleblowing, prevent and control wrongdoing, and
prevent or self-remedy retaliation. Some structural reforms included
establishment of independent mechanisms for disclosure, such as the OSC;
however, SOX reflected a significant shift towards organizational
requirements compared to previous legislation.
In another attempt, Congress tried to get private corporations to set up a
structural model under the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines.150 Taking
a carrot and stick approach, the Organizational Sentencing Guidlines stated
that if an organization adopted an effective program to detect and deter
violations of law, penalties could be reduced (up to 95 percent) if the
organization was convicted of a crime.151 Conversely, penalties could be
increased (up to 400 percent) if the organization had no such program.152

148

Silla Brush, Regulator Twice Failed to Find Fraud at Peregrine, SEATTLE TIMES, July
12, 2012, http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2018709101_peregrine18.
html?syndication=rss. The investigations were made in 2007 and 2008. Id. A third was
scheduled in 2011, but didn’t take place due to lack of resources of the CFTC. Id. The
fraud caused the collapse of Peregrine Financial Group and a shortfall of $200 million in
client funds. Id.
149
Moberly, Corporate Whistleblowers, supra note 8.
150
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2 (1991), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/1991_guidelines/Manual_PDF/1991_Guidelines_
Manual_Full.pdf.
151
See Moberly, Corporate Whistleblowers, supra note 8, at 1134; Dworkin, supra note
18, at 1775.
152
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 150.
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An effective program included a code of ethics and a whistleblowing
procedure that banned retaliation, and was known to employees and
prosecuted effectively.153
A more recent development involving a structural element is found in the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, signed by President Obama on
March 23, 2010, which expands the effort to reduce fraud and recover funds
in the health care area.154 In addition to reward provisions, the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act includes a requirement that long-term
care facilities tell their employees that they are required to report reasonable
suspicion that a crime is occurring, or has occurred, and that if they fail to
do so they are subject to a fine of up to $200,000.
In the absence of reward mechanisms, US experience has been that these
efforts to embed whistleblowing structurally or institutionally have had
limited effect in spurring whistleblowing or protecting whistleblowers.
They have also not prevented crises such as those brought on by Enron,
WorldCom, the Madoff fraud, or the current financial crisis. Nevertheless,
the adoption of a structural model has been relatively piecemeal. This raises
the question whether the approach will nevertheless continue to develop,
and involve—by accident or design—some movement towards a greater
blending of models.
D. Whistleblowing and the Media
By contrast with any of the three preceding approaches, one model,
embraced by neither federal nor state laws, involves significant attention to
protecting whistleblowing to the media.155 This is in some respects
surprising, given that whistleblowing to the media has long provided a
153

See Dworkin, supra note 18, at 1771.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010).
155
See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Who Blows the Whistle to
the Media, and Why: Organizational Characteristics of Media Whistleblowers, 32 AM.
BUS. L.J. 151 (1994).
154
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quintessential example of whistleblowing.156 Among researchers, there has
been debate about whether disclosures that do not reach the public domain
should be categorized as whistleblowing at all.157
Why has this been a silent or missing element in the United States? A
partial explanation lies in the fact that public employees have some
constitutional protection for whistleblowing under the First Amendment.
The 1978 CSRA legislation also sought to buttress these First Amendment
rights of freedom of speech.158 However, provisions once aimed at this
result have proved over time to be of limited benefit. One example is the
1989 WPA extension of protection to disclosures outside official channels
“not specifically prohibited by law . . . if such information is not
specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs.”159
In 2006, the First Amendment protection was also significantly
undermined by the Supreme Court decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos.160 In
this case, a prosecutor wrote a memo asking whether a sheriff’s deputy had
lied in an affidavit to get a search warrant.161 The Court found that when
public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the
employees are not speaking as citizens, and, thus, are not constitutionally
protected from employer sanctions. This was seen as potentially silencing
public employee whistleblowing.162 Attempts to amend the WPA163 and
156

The Pentagon Papers and the Watergate scandals are examples.
See MICELI ET AL., supra note 67, at 7–10, 85.
158
ROBERT G. VAUGHN, THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS 88–
107, 286–308 (2013).
159
Whistleblower Protection Act 1989, 5 U.S.C. § 1213(a)(1)(B) (2002).
160
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
161
Id. at 413–16.
162
MICELI ET AL., supra note 67, at 155. Senators picked up on the Garcetti dissent’s idea
that the majority’s decision could silence whistleblowers and unanimously passed
legislation to overturn it. Id. at 155–56 (Sen. Bill S. 494). The House passed similar
legislation, but the differences between the bills were not resolved in the conference
committee. See id. at 156–57.
157
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provide broader coverage have been unsuccessful.164
In the private sector, legislation does not protect whistleblowing to the
media, and a recent decision showed that courts are also disinclined to
protect this sort of whistleblowing. In Tides v. Boeing Co.,165 the court
rejected the whistleblower’s argument that protection should be given
because whistleblowing to the media might lead to information being
provided to one of the recipients authorized by SOX.166 If the whistleblower
first reports to the media, she or he must then file a claim under the FCA or
Dodd-Frank in order to gain the statutory benefits.167 This disinclination to
extend protection to media whistleblowers seems based on the perception
that whistleblowers go to the media because their claims are “less worthy”
or groundless, or because they are seeking revenge or are compelled by
other bad motives.168 However, studies paint a different picture.169 Most
media whistleblowers turn to the media because they lack power within the
organization to effect change, there is a high risk of retaliation, or they seek
anonymity. Additionally, a lack of meaningful response when the
wrongdoing was reported within the organization prompts this drive toward
the media.170
If the whistleblower chooses to go outside the organization to report, the
163

Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1213(a) (2002).
See MICELI ET AL., supra note 67, at 155–56.
165
Tides v. Boeing Co., 644 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2011); see also, Terry Morehead Dworkin
& Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Employee Disclosures to the Media: When Is a “Source” A
“Sourcerer”?, 15 COMM/ENT L. J. 357, 361 (1993) [hereinafter Dworkin & Callahan,
Employee Disclosures].
166
Dworkin & Callahan, Employee Disclosures, supra note 165, at 816–17.
167
False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2010). The person must be the original
source of the information to the media. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A)(iii).
168
Dworkin & Callahan, Employee Disclosures, supra note 165; Sissela Bok,
Whistleblowing and Professional Responsibility, 11 N.Y.U. EDUC. Q. 1, 4 (1980). [T]he
disappointed, the incompetent, the malicious, and the paranoid all too often leap to
accusations in public . . . .” Id.
169
Dworkin & Callahan, Employee Disclosures, supra note 165, at 392.
170
Id. at 394.
164
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government and the media are the two primary external outlets. Each group
has a different focus, however. The government is charged with serving the
public interest, while the media is more influenced by economic pressures
of competition, especially in the “Internet Age”; newsworthiness is not
necessarily a measure of the public good.171 Additionally, government
entities often want to capture the information themselves and mandate
disclosure to particular persons, agencies, or other entities if the
whistleblower is to be protected.172
In the United States, the focus of whistleblowing laws has shifted
primarily from protection against retaliation to significant rewards for
information. This change has also been marked by a limited focus on
structural models of protection and little attention given to the role of the
media. It remains to be seen how effective the Dodd-Frank law and the
mechanisms created to enforce it will be, but so far, it is the reward model
that has most closely achieved the desired results. This contrasts with the
progression in Australian law, which began similarly in terms of an antiretaliation focus, but has relied more heavily on detailed structural models,
and has most recently turned towards enhancement of the role of the media,
while eschewing rewards entirely.

III. THE MEDIA? WHISTLEBLOWING LAW REFORM IN AUSTRALIA
A. Anti-Retaliation
As in the United States, much of the initial Australian movement towards
statutory recognition of whistleblowing lay in assumptions that fear of
reprisal represented the primary disincentive to employee disclosure of
wrongdoing. In 1990, in the state of Queensland, the first temporary

171

Id. at 393. There is usually a direct relationship between newsworthiness and the
significance of the wrongdoing. Id.
172
Id. at 368.
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whistleblowing legislation was built on removal of official or legal
retaliation (“authorized” reprisals), criminalization of retaliation, and
injunctive relief.173 Soon, a range of Australian state jurisdictions followed
suit with whistleblowing laws covering, for the most part, public-sector
wrongdoing revealed by public-sector employees.174
Much of the aim was to remove official legal barriers to disclosure,
outlaw retaliation, and provide criminal and civil remedies if retaliation
occurred. Civil remedies are based on the creation of a tort of victimization,
which provides a right to sue for damages for detrimental action in the
general courts.175 The only state not to have provided this remedy, New
South Wales (NSW), finally did so in 2010.176 In addition to this remedy,
over time, three states have provided an alternative right to seek restitution
or damages for victimization through anti-discrimination tribunals, whose
role otherwise includes complaints in respect to detrimental action taken on
the basis of gender, racial, or other discrimination.177
The limits of these remedial avenues are immediately clear, even by
comparison with US provisions. Even the most recent addition, in NSW,
173

See Whistleblowers (Interim Protection) and Miscellaneous Amendments Act 1990
(Qld) (Austl.); Brown, Sunshine, supra note 6.
174
See Public Interest Disclosure Act 2003 (WA) (Austl.); Public Interest Disclosure Act
2002 (Tas) (Austl.); Whistleblowers Protection Act 2001 (Vic) (Austl.); Public Interest
Disclosure Act 1994 (ACT) (Austl.); Protected Disclosure Act 1994 (NSW) (Austl.);
Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 (Qld) (Austl.); Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993
(SA) (Austl.).
175
See, e.g., Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993 (SA) s 9(2)(a) (Austl.); see also Public
Interest Disclosure Act 2012 (ACT) s 41 (Austl.); Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994
(Qld) s 43(1) (Austl.) (current version at Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld) ss 4243 (Austl.)); Public Interest Disclosure Act 2003 (WA) 15(1) (Austl.); Public Interest
Disclosure Act 2002 (Tas) s 20(2) (Austl.); Whistleblowers Protection Act 2001 (Vic) s
19(1) (Austl.); Public Interest Disclosure Act 1994 (ACT) s 29 (Austl.).
176
See Protected Disclosures Act 1994 (NSW) s 24 (Austl.) (current version at Public
Interest Disclosure Act 1994 (NSW) s 20(A) (Austl.)).
177
See Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 (Qld) s 45(1)(c) (Austl.) (current version at
Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld) s 44 (Austl.); Whistleblowers Protection Act
1993 (SA) s 9(2)(b) (Austl.); Public Interest Disclosure Act 2003 (WA) s 15(4) (Austl.).
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explicitly provides that recoverable civil damages “do not include
exemplary or punitive damages or damages in the nature of aggravated
damages.”178 General problems of cost and risk of adverse outcomes mean
there have never been more than a handful of claims.179 There are also no
legal firms or services with any significant, specialized experience in such
actions.
Also, the courts have sometimes had difficulty in identifying how these
compensation avenues compare to, or fit with, other compensation rights—
such as those granted under workplace health and safety legislation—as
well as how they can co-exist with the criminal offence of reprisal.180
Indeed, the poor configuration of anti-retaliation rights in state legislation is
replete with ironies. One Queensland court effectively decided that no
action for civil damages could be taken unless the criminal offence of
reprisal had first been proven or could at least be shown to have occurred,
effectively reducing the damages provision to a criminal victim’s
compensation provision.181
Legislative reform to reverse the effect of these and other decisions182
may represent a fairly small “band aid” on the larger problems involved.
These reforms reflect the general problem that strong focus on the
criminalization of reprisals—intended to be a strength of Australian antiretaliation approaches—has proven to be more symbolic than substantive.
Very few prosecutions for reprisal have been undertaken and there have
been no known successes.183 While reprisal offences may help encourage
178

Public Interest Disclosure Act 1994 (NSW) s 20(A)(3) (Austl.).
See A.J. Brown et al., Best Practice Whistleblowing Legislation for the Public Sector:
Key Principles, in WHISTLEBLOWING IN THE AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC SECTOR: ENHANCING
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNAL WITNESS MANAGEMENT IN PUBLIC SECTOR
ORGANISATIONS 261, 271–77 (2008) (discussing the few known claims).
180
See id.
181
See Howard v Queensland [2000] Qd R 223 (Austl.); Brown et al., supra note 179.
182
See Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld) s 42(5) (Austl.).
183
Brown et al., supra note 179.
179
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whistleblowing and deter reprisals, in practice they may have made real
whistleblower protection more difficult by distracting from, or masking, the
reality that the vast bulk of adverse outcomes unjustly suffered by
whistleblowers are never likely to be proven to a criminal standard.184
Further irony is found in the possibility that the statutory tort of
victimization, as presently configured, may close off, or restrict, other more
generous rights under the general law of employment. For example, one of
the few significant compensation awards was in favor of a NSW police
officer whose employer failed to sufficiently support him after he reported
and gave evidence of suspected internal misconduct.185 The claim was
brought under common law principles of employment, rather than under
any whistleblowing remedy, which in NSW may now have restricted rather
than amplified the chances of such outcomes.
Other cases similarly suggest that, at best, the civil compensation
provisions offer little practical benefit to aggrieved whistleblowers. They
exist in parallel to existing rights of compensation for work-based injury,
which, while ill-matched to whistleblowing situations, are at least a more
recognizable part of the legal landscape.186 For example, the confidential
settlement achieved in 2012 by one of Australia’s most prominent
whistleblowers, nursing manager Toni Hoffman, was achieved in response
to a claim under the Workers’ Compensation and Rehabilitation Act 2003
(Qld). The national and international media profile of the case was
undoubtedly of greater assistance to this settlement than were the relevant
184

See Rodney Smith & A.J. Brown, The Good, The Bad and the Ugly: Whistleblowing
Outcomes, in WHISTLEBLOWING IN THE AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC SECTOR: ENHANCING THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNAL WITNESS MANAGEMENT IN PUBLIC SECTOR
ORGANISATIONS, 129–30, 134 (2008).
185
See Wheadon v New South Wales (Unreported, District Court of NSW, Feb. 2, 2001)
(Austl.) (ordering the NSW Police Service to pay AUD$664,270 for having breached its
duty of care to the officer, who experienced harassment and victimization resulting in
serious stress culminating in psychiatric illness).
186
Brown et al., supra note 179.
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whistleblowing anti-retaliation provisions.187
It is unlikely that the irrelevance of such provisions is because
whistleblowers are undeserving of compensation. Recent empirical research
into public sector whistleblowing, encapsulating 118 federal, state, and
local agencies, confirms that the need exists for more effective, realistic,
targeted, and low-cost compensation mechanisms.188 Although not all
whistleblowers claim to suffer mistreatment or retaliation, significant
proportions do, directly or indirectly.189 The risks of mistreatment quickly
escalate if public employees report wrongdoing that is more widespread or
systemic, particularly involving more senior employees.190 The experience
of whistleblowers is generally corroborated by evidence from managers and
case handlers.191 Yet outside normal misconduct investigation channels,
Australia’s state whistleblowing regimes do not offer even an intermediate
administrative path to remedies for retaliation or mismanagement, like those
offered under some US regimes (successful or otherwise). The closest
187

See Toni Hoffman Settles Claim for Compensation, MAURICE BLACKBURN LAWYERS
(Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.mauriceblackburn.com.au/news/press-releases—
announcements/2012/toni-hoffman-settles-claim-for-compensation.aspx. The original
claim was for AUD$400,000 for medical expenses, loss of income and superannuation
and stress arising mostly from the wrongdoing and investigation processes, including lack
of support, as well as loss of future earnings due to the general impact on her career. See
Dr Jayant Patel Nurse Toni Hoffman and Queensland Health Settle Claim,
COURIERMAIL.COM.AU (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/
queensland/patel-nurse-queensland-health-settle-claim/story-e6freoof-1226294131009.
Alleged direct reprisals or retaliation were limited to vilification and ostracism by local
managers, since dismissed or disciplined. Ms. Hoffman remains employed by
Queensland Health. See Hoffman v Queensland (Unreported, Dist. Ct., Dec. 12, 2011)
(Austl.). For an overall account of the “Dr. Death” case involving serial criminal medical
negligence resulting in death, see HEDLEY THOMAS, SICK TO DEATH (2007).
188
See Brown et al., supra note 179, at 109–60, 203–32, 261–88.
189
See Smith & Brown, supra note 184, at 127–29, 134.
190
See A.J. Brown & Jane Olsen, Whistleblower Mistreatment: Identifying the Risks, in
WHISTLEBLOWING IN THE AUSTRALIAN PUBLIC SECTOR: ENHANCING THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF INTERNAL WITNESS MANAGEMENT IN PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANISATIONS
(2008).
191
See Smith & Brown, supra note 184, at 127–29, 134.

VOLUME 11 • ISSUE 2 • 2013

687

688 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

equivalents are the anti-discrimination remedies noted earlier, but again,
there is little sign that these are proving accessible or successful. Statistics
on the tiny number of cases handled recently by the most established antidiscrimination regime—South Australia—suggest otherwise.192
Until recently, the stagnation of Australian anti-retaliation provisions,
notwithstanding recent and current law reform efforts in the public sector,
has been reinforced by the state of policy at the federal level. In contrast to
state efforts, no federal public-sector whistleblowing legislation exists,
despite recommendations for such legislation since the early 1990s.193 A
new Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) included a provision prohibiting
victimization against many federal servants if they reported misconduct, but
without any separate enforceable remedies. More recently, political shifts
and a fresh parliamentary inquiry194 led to two federal public interest
disclosure bills covering public sector wrongdoing, including the first ever
192

EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2007-08 17 (2008), available at
http://www.eoc.sa.gov.au/sites/eoc.sa.gov.au/files/attachments/annual_report_2008.pdf
(finding one complaint lodged); see also EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ANNUAL
REPORT 2008-09 18 (2009), available at http://www.eoc.sa.gov.au/sites/eoc.sa.gov.au/
files/attachments/annual_report_2009.pdf (finding eight complaints but none found to be
within the Act); EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2009-10 39–41
(2010), available at http://www.eoc.sa.gov.au/sites/eoc.sa.gov.au/files/attachments/200910_annual_report_print.pdf (finding eight complaints with one found to be within to be
within the Act); EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2010-11 21 (2011),
available at http://www.eoc.sa.gov.au/sites/eoc.sa.gov.au/files/attachments/2010-11_
annual_report.pdf (finding that five complaints, three within the Act, one conciliated, two
may proceed to tribunal hearing); cf. Smith & Brown, supra note 184 (stating statistical
evidence that the number of state government employees deserving of reportable
remedies for mistreatment in public interest reporting cases are more likely to number in
the hundreds (perhaps 500–700) per year, based on data from other jurisdictions). For
concerns about the adequacy of the provisions from the start, see SENATE SELECT
COMM., supra note 7, at ¶ 4.48-4.51.
193
See, e.g., SENATE SELECT COMM., supra note 7.
194
See HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL & CONSTITUTIONAL
AFFAIRS, WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION: A COMPREHENSIVE SCHEME FOR THE
COMMONWEALTH PUBLIC SECTOR (1999) (Cth) (Austl.), available at
http://fraud.govspace.gov.au/files/2010/12/Whistleblower-protection-House-ofRepresentatives.pdf [hereinafter STANDING COMM.].
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government bill.195 These are before the federal parliament at the time of
writing. The issue of effective remedies proved one of the most
problematic. The parliamentary committee’s primary suggestion—that an
enforceable compensation mechanism for federal employees be embedded
in the new federal Fair Work Act then under design—was initially rejected
by the federal government without clarity as to what alternative antiretaliation mechanism would be available.196
Similarly, anti-retaliation measures in the only national private sector
whistleblowing legislation, Part 9.4AAA of the Corporations Act 2001
(Cth), are severely limited. Despite recommendations dating from 1994, it
took until 2004 for these measures to be introduced as part of corporate
transparency reforms that paralleled SOX.197 Far from being
comprehensive, however, the provisions relate only to reported breaches of
corporations legislation and no other regulation.198 Additionally, they
provide only ill-defined rights of reinstatement in the event of dismissal or
compensation in the event that a criminal offence of victimization is
proven.199 These provisions provide nothing in between, nor any
mechanisms for administrative relief or independent investigation of
195

The first was a private member’s bill introduced by Independent MP Andrew Wilkie
in October 2012. See Public Interest Disclosure (Whistleblower Protection) Bill 2012
(Cth) (Austl.); Public Interest Disclosure (Whistleblower Protection) (Consequential
Amendments) Bill 2012 (Cth) (Austl.). The government bill was introduced in March
2013. See Public Interest Disclosure Bill 2013 (Cth) (Austl.).
196
See id. at 104; cf. Government Response: Whistleblower Protection: A Comprehensive
Scheme for the Commonwealth Public Sector, (2010) (Tabled by Sen. J Ludwig, Special
Minister of State (Cth) (Austl.)), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/house/
committee/laca/whistleblowing/report/governmentresponse.pdf
[hereinafter
Comprehensive Scheme] (“The Government will further consider options to protect
persons who make disclosures under the scheme from detrimental treatment in the
workplace which occurs as a result of making the disclosure.”).
197
See Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate
Disclosure) Act 2004 (Cth) (Austl.).
198
See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 1317AB, AC, AD (Austl.).
199
Id.
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reprisal claims.200 In October 2009, a review of the provisions was initiated
by the federal treasury and attorney general, but the review did not identify
these problems as priorities for reform and it was never formally
concluded.201 No known actions (criminal or civil) have been brought under
the provisions in the eight years of their existence.
The almost total failure of the anti-retaliation model, as an element of
Australian whistleblowing law, raises many questions. The provisions
(where they exist) are highly rudimentary, even by comparison to the US
provisions that originally inspired them. Moreover, as a general rule they
have been conceived and enacted without reference to the most relevant
avenues for ensuring organizational justice through Australia’s workplace
relations or industrial relations system. This system is highly developed by
comparison to the United States, and instead bears closer resemblance to
that of the United Kingdom where it was taken up as the natural home for a
patently more successful system of whistleblower compensation in 1998.202
It is only recently that restructuring of Australia’s workplace relations
system under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) and new uniform national
health and safety laws has made the prospect of more seamless
whistleblower protection laws more possible.203 Part of the explanation for
the lack of success also lies in a drift of policymaking in the 1990s away
200
201

Id.
See

ATT’Y GEN. DEP’T, IMPROVING PROTECTIONS FOR CORPORATE
WHISTLEBLOWERS: OPTIONS PAPER (2009) (Cth) (Austl.), available at
http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/1620/RTF/whistleblowers_options_paper.rtf.
202
See, e.g., Hon. Jeremy McMullen, Ten Years of Employment Protection for
Whistleblowers in the UK: A View from the Employment Appeal Tribunal, in A GLOBAL
APPROACH TO PUBLIC INTEREST DISCLOSURE: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM EXISTING
WHISTLEBLOWING LEGISLATION AND RESEARCH? 7 (2010).
203
See Workplace Relations (Work Choices) Act 2005 (Cth) (Austl.); Fair Work Act 2009
(Cth) (Austl.); Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Cth) (Austl.); New South Wales v
Commonwealth [2006] 231 ALR 1 (Austl.). See generally SAFE WORK AUSTRALIA,
http://www.safeworkaustralia.gov.au (last visited Oct. 22, 2012) (listings of model
uniform workplace health and safety laws).
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from employment-based approaches to protection. This drift was due to
arguments that whistleblowing should be given “as broad a definition as
possible to include disclosures by people from within or outside the
organization”204—not just those disclosures protectable through workplacebased relationships. Because these relationships lie at the heart of
whistleblowing, however, the result of this broader approach has instead
been that there is no effective protection for anyone. At the time of writing,
the new federal public sector bills both offer a new direction, more
consistent with the United Kingdom regime, by returning to the earlier
recommendation and by proposing to connect whistleblower compensation
rights to the remedial avenues available under the Fair Work Act 2009.205
Whether this will be achieved, and if so, how well it will work, will only be
known with time.
B. Structural/Institutional
While the anti-retaliation model has a poor track record, there is evidence
of greater success from the other focuses in Australian whistleblowing laws.
More than in US law, legislation at the Australian state level (and proposed
for the federal public sector) has concentrated on structural and institutional
regimes aimed at preventing and minimizing retaliation by ensuring that
whistleblowers have effective means of disclosure, are responded to, and,
theoretically, are supported and protected. The approach had only thin
statutory effects at the outset. For example, the first South Australian
legislation provided no such detail regarding internal disclosure procedures,
investigative responsibilities, or whistleblower support.206 A future
204

See SENATE SELECT COMM., supra note 7, ¶ 2.12.
See Public Interest Disclosure (Whistleblower Protection) Bill 2012 (Cth) s 41
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2013 (Cth) s 18 (Austl.).
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commonwealth ombudsman, John McMillan, noted that the Act imposed
“no obligation upon agencies to define a whistleblowing procedure.”207
However, this criticism reinforces the importance being placed on this
structural approach, even at that time.
By contrast, the major review leading to the Queensland legislation gave
a high priority to the structural approach,208 and the law itself required that
any public service manager, internal auditor, or investigative authority, in
addition to designated officers, must be ready to receive and recognize
whistleblowing disclosures.209 Federal parliamentary committees reinforced
the approach.210 Recently, the structural approach has continued to expand.
For example, the Queensland legislation always provided that every public
agency “must establish reasonable procedures to protect its officers from
reprisals that are, or may be, taken against them by the entity or other
officers of the entity.”211 The legislation was reformed in 2010 to follow the
precedent set by other states (principally Victoria and Western Australia),
specifying in detail the obligations on organizations to recognize and
manage disclosures, and to require a lead oversight agency to specify
guidelines with which organizations’ own internal disclosure procedures
must then comply.212
Australian Capital Territory legislation from 2012 sets out the latest,
current best practice framework.213 The approach is also taken up in the

207

SENATE SELECT COMM., supra note 7, ¶ 4.46.
QUEENSL. ELECTORAL AND ADMIN. REVIEW COMM’N, REPORT ON PROTECTION OF
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209
See Whistleblowers Protection Act 1994 (Qld) ss 26-27 (Austl.) (current version at
Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld) s 17 (Austl.)); see also Public Disclosure Act
2012 (ACT) s 15 (Austl.).
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Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld) ss 28, 49, 60 (Austl.)).
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current federal public sector bills, mentioned earlier.214 Specific innovations
include statutory requirements for retaliation risks to be assessed and
managed from the outset of internal disclosure receipt.215 The approach
contrasts with US approaches because it focuses strongly on internal
whistleblowing procedures and management obligations, including
preventative support, as opposed to the creation of whistleblowing channels
to independent agencies. More recently, the approach has also been
bolstered by stronger systems of external oversight, usually by the relevant
government ombudsman.216 However, internal disclosure procedures remain
at its core.
Large gaps in the take-up of the structural approach remain. For example,
it is non-existent in the private sector. The transparency reforms introduced
into corporate law in 2004 did not even go as far as SOX; yet, no equivalent
of Dodd-Frank has yet been introduced. Instead, a voluntary Australian
standard may be used.217 Further, the empirical research shows that while
public-sector organizations can be quite good at developing and
implementing procedures to encourage whistleblowing and act on the
disclosures, they are far less proficient in developing and implementing
procedures to protect and support their staff.218 Serious questions remain
214

See SENATE SELECT COMM., supra note 7.
See Public Interest Disclosure Act 2012 (ACT) s 33(2) (Austl.); Public Interest
Disclosure (Whistleblower Protection) Bill 2012 (Cth) ss 34(b), 35(2)(e) and (f) (Austl.);
Public Interest Disclosure Bill 2013 (Cth) s 59(1) (Austl.).
216
See Public Interest Disclosure Act 1994 (NSW) s 20(A)(3) (Austl.), for a discussion
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oversight role was initially allocated to the Public Service Commission, but has recently
been transferred to the Ombudsman); Public Service and Other Legislation Amendment
Act 2012 (Qld) (Austl.).
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about the adequacy of legislative requirements governing the role of
oversight agencies and their preparedness to assist whistleblowers when
organizational trust breaks down.219 Nevertheless, there is clear evidence
that agencies that take their responsibilities to whistleblowers seriously—
and many do—achieve better outcomes in the management of
whistleblowing than agencies that do not.220 Thus, in Australia, more than in
the United States, there are some signs of success from the implementation
of structural or institutional approaches, at least in the public sector, and
these approaches have potential for greater success in the future.
C. Media/Public Whistleblowing
In addition to efforts to strengthen the structural approaches, the most
dramatic area of recent Australian reform, contrasting even more strongly
with US reform, is the growing statutory recognition of the role of
whistleblowing to the media. Australia has no equivalent to the First
Amendment and no broad constitutional protection of free speech relevant
to public whistleblowing, whether by public servants or others. Since 1994,
the High Court has recognized a more limited, implied freedom of political
communication.221 This was used in one instance to overturn a blanket
PRACTICE OF INTERNAL WITNESS MANAGEMENT IN PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANISATIONS
203 (2008); Peter Roberts, Evaluating Agency Responses: Comprehensiveness and the
Impact of Whistleblowing Procedures, in WHISTLEBLOWING IN THE AUSTRALIAN
PUBLIC SECTOR: ENHANCING THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNAL WITNESS
MANAGEMENT IN PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANISATIONS 233 (2008).
219
See Lindy Annakin, In the Public Interest or Out of Desperation? The Experience of
Australian Whistleblowers Reporting to Accountability Agencies (Mar. 2011)
(Unpublished
Ph.D.
thesis,
University
of
Sydney),
available
at
http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/bitstream/2123/7904/1/l_annakin_2011_thesis.pdf.
220
See Roberts, supra note 218; PETER ROBERTS, A.J. BROWN & JANE OLSEN,
WHISTLING WHILE THEY WORK: A GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE FOR MANAGING INTERNAL
REPORTING OF WRONGDOING IN PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANISATIONS (2011).
221
See Bennett v President, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Comm’n [2003] 204
ALR 119 (Austl.) (questioning the validity of Public Service Regulation 7(13),
prohibiting a federal employee from disclosing “directly or indirectly, to any person any
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regulation banning federal public servants from releasing any official
information whatsoever without permission.222
Instead, as traditionally was the case under English law, the principal
protection for public revelation by whistleblowers lay in a common law
public interest defense to actions for a criminal or civil breach of
confidentiality.223 By 1994, however, the Senate Select Committee on
Public Interest Whistleblowing noted that the scope and relevance of this
defense in modern circumstances was extremely unclear.224 Since then, it
has been increasingly accepted that statutory protection should include
disclosure to the media where such disclosure is “excusable in all the
circumstances,” taking into account “the seriousness of the allegations,
reasonable belief in their accuracy, and reasonable belief that to make a
disclosure along other channels might be futile or result in the
whistleblower being victimised.”225
At first, only one Australian jurisdiction moved to operationalize this
principle—and inadequately. The Protected Disclosures Act 1994 (NSW)
recognized public whistleblowing by including a “journalist” among the
persons to whom a disclosure could be made, as a last resort, provided the
disclosure was “substantially true.”226 This nevertheless made NSW the first
jurisdiction, possibly worldwide, to legislate what is now known as a three-

information about public business or anything of which the employee has official
knowledge.”); see also Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 70(2) (Austl.). See generally
AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, SECRECY LAWS AND OPEN GOVERNMENT IN
AUSTRALIA: REPORT 112 (2009), available at http://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/
pdfs/publications/ALRC112.pdf.
222
Bennett, 204 ALR 119 (Austl.).
223
See Gartside v Outram (1856) 26 L.J. 113 (Austl.); Allied Mills Ltd v Trade Practices
Comm’n (1980) 55 FLR 125 (Austl.); Attn’y Gen. (UK) v Heinemann Publishers (1987)
75 ALR 461 (Austl.).
224
See SENATE SELECT COMM., supra note 7, at ¶ 8.27.
225
Id. ¶ 9.130.
226
See Protection Disclosures Act 1994 (NSW) s 19 (Austl.) (current version at Public
Interest Disclosures Act 1994 (NSW) s 19 (Austl.)) for a definition of “Journalist.”
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tiered model of internal, regulatory, and public whistleblowing,227 more
widely recognizable since the enactment of the Public Interest Disclosure
Act 1998 (UK) four years later.228
By contrast, other early legislation took different, confusing approaches.
South Australia’s Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993 did not necessarily
disturb the common law position, but also did not expressly incorporate public
disclosure. Its architect described the provisions as intended to “deter
whistleblowing allegations being sensationalised inappropriately through
the media,” due to “the justifiable need for a politically neutral and
impartial public service to keep some matters confidential while serving the
government of the day.”229 In Queensland, the Whistleblower Protection
Act 1994 positively neutralized any remnant common law principle by
excluding the media from the “appropriate” persons to whom disclosures
could be made.230 The logic of this—that good internal and regulatory
whistleblowing regimes should prevent any need for whistleblowers to ever
go public—was repeated as late as 2006 in official advice that “untested
allegations” aired in the media could “unjustly bring the person against
whom the allegations are made into disrepute[,] . . . prejudice the conduct of
the investigation[,]” and “unnecessarily disrupt the workplace.”231
Recently, significant reform has re-established disclosure to the media as
227

See Wim Vandekerckhove, European Whistleblower Protection: Tiers or Tears?, in A
GLOBAL APPROACH TO PUBLIC INTEREST DISCLOSURE: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM
EXISTING WHISTLEBLOWING LEGISLATION AND RESEARCH? 16-17 (2008) (describing
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228
See Employment Rights Act, 1996, §§ 43G, 43H (U.K.) (current version at Public
Interest Disclosure Act, 1998, (U.K.)).
229
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AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW NEWSLETTER NO. 13, 1993, at 14;
see SENATE SELECT COMM., supra note 7, at ¶ 4.43.
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See Whistleblower Protection Act 1994 (Qld) s 25 (Austl.).
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a firm part of best practice whistleblowing laws, at least for the public
sector. In 2007, the incoming federal government committed to the reversal
of a draconian approach to the treatment of whistleblowers and
journalists.232 It matched the NSW approach by protecting any
whistleblower who “has gone through the available official channels, but
has not had success within a reasonable timeframe and . . . where the
whistleblower is clearly vindicated by their disclosure.”233 Right to Know, a
coalition of media organizations commissioned an audit of government
secrecy that recommended that legislation should at least protect
“whistleblowers who disclose to the media after a reasonable attempt to
have the matter dealt with internally or where such a course was
impractical.”234 The results of the empirical research, released in September
2008, reinforced this position.235
Since that time, four jurisdictions have moved to recognize public or
media whistleblowing as a formal part of the regime—Queensland, Western
Australia, the Australian Capital Territory, and, in principle, the federal
government. In 2010, Queensland’s new Public Interest Disclosure Act
adapted and liberalized the NSW provision from sixteen years earlier.236
The NSW provision now provides that whistleblowers will retain legal
232
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http://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/151274/brownaug2007.pdf, for an overview of these cases.
233
Kevin Rudd & Joe Ludwig, Government Information: Restoring Trust and Integrity,
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2Fpdf#search=%22ALP%20library%20d-g%22.
234
Press Release, Irene Moss, Chair, Australia’s Right to Know Report on the
Independent Audit into the State of Free Speech in Australia (Oct. 31, 2007) (on file with
author).
235
See Brown et al., supra note 179.
236
See Public Interest Disclosure Act 2010 (Qld) s 20(4) (Austl.) (defining “Journalist” to
mean “a person engaged in the occupation of writing or editing material intended for
publication in the print or electronic news media”).

VOLUME 11 • ISSUE 2 • 2013

697

698 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

protection if they take a public interest disclosure to a journalist after they
have first taken it to an official authority and that authority has either
“decided not to investigate or deal with the disclosure,” not recommended
any action, or failed to notify the whistleblower whether the disclosure was
to be investigated.237 While only providing for media disclosures after
official channels have been tried, this provision was arguably the most
liberal of its kind in the world—given parliamentary confirmation that it
included facility for officials to go public, more or less immediately, in the
face of a simple “deemed refusal” to respond to an internal disclosure.238
A similar reform has since been introduced to Western Australia’s Public
Interest Disclosure Act 2003.239 Most significantly, an even more thoughtful
approach was introduced in reforms to the Australian Capital Territory’s
legislation. Under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2012 (ACT), a
whistleblower may make a public interest disclosure to a journalist if an
official authority has committed the following: “refused or failed to
investigate” the disclosure; given no response or progress report on a
disclosure in three months; or investigated but proposed no action in
circumstances where there remains “clear evidence” of the disclosed
conduct.240 In addition to striking this new, arguably more sustainable
balance as to when whistleblowers should go public, the same provision
was the first in Australia to permit a whistleblower to go public without first
making an internal or regulatory disclosure, if going to the authorities
237
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would involve a “significant risk of detrimental action” and be
“unreasonable in all the circumstances.”241 In another refinement, the
whistleblower only retains protection if he or she only discloses to
journalists what is “reasonably necessary” to achieve action.242 This is in
line with objectives of whistleblower protection, and with the needs of
whistleblowers, while precluding misuse of the legislation to agitate
collateral causes or release information other than that relating to the
unresolved elements of the disclosure.
The fourth Australian jurisdiction in which policy change has occurred is
the federal one. To date, the only actual action taken by the federal
government has been to enact a journalism “shield law” that strengthens
journalists’ ability to protect the identity of confidential sources—including
whistleblowers—by affording a legal privilege to refuse to reveal the
identity of sources in court.243 However, in line with the policy shift towards
protection of disclosure to the media, the key House of Representatives
inquiry in 2009 recommended that this form of disclosure must be
incorporated in the proposed federal whistleblowing regime: “[E]xperience
has shown that internal processes can sometimes fail[,] . . . that the
disclosure framework within the public sector may not adequately handle an
241
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issue and that a subsequent disclosure to the media could serve the public
interest”; any other approach would simply “lack credibility.”244 While the
committee’s recommendation was limited,245 the federal government’s
response in March 2010 was more liberal, promising that the legislation
would protect public whistleblowing as a first resort where there is a
“substantial and imminent danger or harm to life or public health and safety,
and there are exceptional circumstances” excusing the lack of a prior
internal or regulatory disclosure. It also stated that whistleblowing to the
media would be protected as a last resort wherever the disclosure relates to
a “serious matter” and the “public interest in disclosure outweighs
countervailing public interest factors (e.g., protection of international
relations, national security, cabinet deliberations).”246 This last qualification
may yet prove to nullify the value of the measure, especially since the
government also announced that public whistleblowing would not be
protected where it involved “intelligence-related information.”247
Controversy, hence, remains, as the current federal bills take divergent
approaches to how this principle should be implemented and what
circumstances it will cover.248 Nevertheless, the basic principle is clear—
public or media whistleblowing will be built into the federal scheme, if or
when enacted.
No equivalent movement to protect public whistleblowing is occurring in
the Australian private sector. This is notwithstanding the fact that, arguably,
244
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some protection of whistleblowing to the media remains just as important
for private-sector accountability as for the public sector in the age of
corporate social responsibility, environmental and consumer protection, and
market transparency.
In any event, the key logic of this reform now extends beyond either
simple clarification of a confused common law position, or acceptance of
the political reality that public whistleblowing is going to occur and be
valued. In addition, statutory recognition of the media as a third tier of the
regime now represents a deliberate “driver” for change, providing official
sanction to the risk of the “front page test” if public institutions fail to
improve their integrity systems, or support for their employees. It
institutionalizes the principle stated by a veteran political journalist, Laurie
Oakes, that “leaks are the difference between a democracy and an
authoritarian society. . . . [T]he risk of being found out via leaks makes
those in authority think twice about telling porkies [lies], performing their
duties sloppily, behaving badly, or rorting [abusing] the system.”249 As
such, the focus on public whistleblowing works in conjunction with other
models, being intended partly to promote organizational justice and combat
retaliation and partly to extend the structural or institutional model to
include “unofficial” channels.
D. Bounty/Reward Models
While the Australian track record in respect to public or media
whistleblower protection contrasts with that of the United States, an even
larger contrast exists regarding reward or bounty approaches. Despite the
249
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common precepts of whistleblower protection in both countries, in Australia
this approach has been almost entirely officially eschewed. The primary
reasons appear to be cultural; Australians have a different response to the
issue of propriety.
In 1989, one of the first parliamentary inquiries to consider copying some
of the US whistleblower provisions was assembled in response to exposure
of insider trading in private sector regimes.250 The inquiry concluded that
any system of rewards or bounties was “incompatible with current attitudes
in relation to the credibility of evidence. . . . [a]nd with accepted principles
and practice within Australian society.”251
In 1994, the Senate Select Committee also recommended firmly against
establishment of any system of rewards for whistleblowing, even in relation
to fraud.252 According to the committee, whistleblowers “are not motivated
by the thought of reward, rather they are generally motivated by public
interest,” making rewards inapt.253 A “general agreement” existed among
those who addressed the issue that rewards or bounties should not be
encouraged.254 Other inquiries also concluded that it was simply “a citizen’s
duty to report fraud, theft etc.,” “part of the responsibilities of public
servants to do the same,” and that there was “no proof” that reward systems
promote whistleblowing.255 Even Dr. William de Maria, a prominent
Australian whistleblowing researcher, criticized US-style “bounty hunting”
as “an incorrect and dangerous inducement on which to expect people of
goodwill to come forward,” preferring instead that they “come forward on
the old fashioned basis of just being ethically disturbed with what they
250
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see.”256
Assumptions biased against the use of rewards or bounties appear to be
softening. A 2009 House of Representatives inquiry received much stronger
evidence and arguments that qui tam provisions could play a useful role in
whistleblowing law reform, and accepted that provisions such as those
contained in the US FCA had “an important role” at least in combating
fraud.257 The committee did not reach a conclusion on the issue of rewards,
citing the fact that its main focus lay on “public interest disclosures within
the Australian Government public sector concerning the conduct of public
officials.”258 Nevertheless, while the political environment is increasingly
fertile for a shift towards a reward system, there remains no specific
movement towards the take-up of such provisions in respect to either the
public or private sectors.

IV. ANALYSIS: FOUR OPTIONS, MODELS, OR STRANDS?
A. Contrasting Histories
What do these contrasting legal histories tell us about the preferred
direction of whistleblower law reform? While the United States and
Australia are both post-colonial federations with often-similar constitutional
and legal structures, there are significant differences between the countries,
particularly in terms of population and economic size. It is also clear that a
federal public-sector whistleblowing regime has been much slower to
materialize in any form in Australia than in the United States, and efforts
towards the development of private-sector whistleblowing regimes in
Australia, even those based on the original anti-retaliation model, have been
even slower to ripen. A full account of the reasons for all the relevant
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differences is beyond the scope of this article.
Nevertheless, the aggregation of laws in both countries shows four
distinct legislative models or options at work: anti-retaliation or
organizational justice; reward or bounty; institutional or structural; and
public or media. Clear identification of these different strategies and options
is significant because until recently, there has been little by way of
theoretical overview to explain these apparently disparate approaches.
Indeed, in the absence of an integrative picture, they have tended to unfold
as competing models. In both countries, jurisdictions appear to have lurched
for better solutions in a relatively blind fashion, looking for something more
effective or persuasive, without necessarily evaluating why the previous
effort did not work, or whether the strategies might be more effectively
brought together.
To date, comparative legal analysis has only been of limited assistance.
Analysis has looked across different jurisdictions in order to produce lists of
principles that unite, or that could be used as a guide to the design of,
whistleblowing legislation in different places.259 Such principles help
highlight that the comprehensive adoption of all potentially desirable
elements of a whistleblowing law, in any country, occurs rarely if ever.
However, these principles may not necessarily assist the process of law
reform because of the tendency of government to pick and choose those that
259
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are easiest to adopt, without a clear understanding of their relative
importance or the possibility that, in fact, all the principles are vital.
As the histories attest, whistleblowing law reform is made especially
complex by the different fields of policy, regulation, and law that are
spanned by the legislation to date. These fields include the following:
employment law (public and private), in terms of both basic employment
rights and specific disciplinary and misconduct regimes; workplace health
and safety law; law pertaining to administrative justice; institutional
accountability and open government (or, in the private sector, regulation
relating to corporate transparency and social responsibility); media law; and
constitutional law. With policymaking and regulation divided into very
distinct silos in both societies, an integrated approach is plainly a challenge.
However, the “second round” divergence in the US and Australian law
reforms helps identify both the need for, and possible nature of, such an
integrated approach. The four models, or approaches, revealed to be at work
in both places, already have a range of relationships and, it would seem,
could benefit from more connection. The models may also provide evidence
to support recent attempts by analysts and researchers to find an overall
framework for mapping the different legal dimensions involved in
whistleblowing laws. For example, the leading analysis, by Professor
Robert Vaughn of the Washington College of Law, identifies four different
“perspectives” at work in the field of whistleblowing law, which influence
the character of legal standards and the scope of protections in any case: (1)
an employment perspective; (2) an open-government perspective; (3) a
market or regulatory perspective; and (4) a human rights perspective.260
According to Vaughn, these perspectives do not simply label aspects of
whistleblower laws, but emphasize differing justifications, demonstrate
connection with distinct bodies of law containing their own theories and
260

See VAUGHN, supra note 158, at ch. 15.

VOLUME 11 • ISSUE 2 • 2013

705

706 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

assumptions, and present different criteria for success and failure. As shown
in Figure 1, they also relate to one another in a variety of ways: some
embody greater concern with individual rights, while others demonstrate a
greater concern with institutional reform; and some are likely to address the
public sector, while others address the private sector.
Figure 1. A Matrix of Perspectives on the Nature of Whistleblowing
Provisions261

PUBLIC
Human
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INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS

INSTITUTIONAL
REFORM

Employment

Market
Regulation
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Significantly, there is some correlation between Vaughn’s picture and the
four main legislative models or options that emerge from the country
comparisons above. Measures that deploy these models, separately or in a
mixture, can be seen as providing different types of incentives, both to
whistleblowing and to organizational or political responsiveness to
whistleblowing. Public or media provisions align strongly with the public
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dimension in Figure 1; the institutional or structural model aligns with the
institutional reform dimension; the original anti-retaliation approach aligns
with an individual rights dimension; and the reward or bounty model
aligns—although perhaps less neatly—with the private dimension.
This consonance may be, in part, because Vaughn is drawing his lessons
from similar reference points of history. Nevertheless, it tends to confirm
that rather than treating these approaches as competing alternatives, to be
tried as each previous approach fails, it may be important to evaluate the
extent to which previous difficulties are flowing from a failure to realize
how these different dimensions and options interrelate.
In fact, it may be better to view them not as alternative models, but rather
as four strands that would be best woven together in a more complementary
fashion. As Vaughn notes, the different perspectives may conflict, with
these conflicts also helping explain some of the areas—especially antiretaliation provisions—in which whistleblowing measures have had greatest
difficulty.262 But overall, Vaughn’s picture and these comparisons tend to
reinforce that unless legal strategies in these disparate areas are recognized
and reconciled in the legislative process, truly effective whistleblowing
regimes may remain elusive. Clearly, no individual segmented approach is
providing a total solution in and of itself. Accordingly, these histories tend
to suggest that it will be where these different perspectives can be
reconciled, integrated, and deployed in a mutually-reinforcing fashion that
prospects of achieving the intended outcomes would appear greatest.
B. Lessons for the Future?
Left to its present, often chaotic course, the pattern of law reform
described in the previous parts looks likely to continue. In each country,
pressures for new and different approaches stems, at least in large part, from
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the failure of the original anti-retaliation approach, to a significant degree in
the United States and almost totally in Australia. Twenty years later,
however, the “second round” divergence in approaches between the
countries can be seen to stem not from systematic acknowledgement of that
failure, but rather as a resort to try different alternative measures in each
country that are assumed to be more effective.
In Australia, a major question is whether the focus on rewards and
bounties prevalent in whistleblowing regimes in the United States will ever
be adopted. The best guess is that rewards and bounties will indeed be taken
up, but differently than in the United States, due to the significant
differences in context between the two countries. The size of government
and the economy in the United States means that the scale of rewards
payable as a percentage of either proven fraud on government, or of
regulatory penalties in the private sector, is always likely to be significantly
greater, in most cases, than could be achieved from equivalent cases in a
small-to-mid sized economy such as Australia’s economy. A high
consciousness is likely to remain in Australia that reward and bounty
mechanisms only relate to one fragment of the whistleblowing agenda.
Likely, these mechanisms would only be applied to those circumstances
where wrongdoing results in financially quantifiable losses, as opposed to
many other types of damage or harm, or where financial penalties are
imposed.
For these reasons, it is likely that reward/bounty mechanisms will
continue to be eschewed with respect to public-sector whistleblower
protection. However, they likely will be introduced as part of the armory of
regulation for the private sector, and thus become available to corporate
whistleblowers. This prediction is reinforced by the prominence of
whistleblower protection as one element of international anti-corruption and
accountability reforms being developed through the G-20 group of nations
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in the wake of the most recent financial crisis.263 Reforms such as DoddFrank have increased salience for all developed countries, which is a natural
result of the increased globalization of accountability and anti-corruption
strategies in response to globalized business and economic risks. As a
highly engaged member of the G-20, Australia is likely to be increasingly
sympathetic to such international strategies, irrespective of previous cultural
and political differences that may have meant significant differences in
sympathy for rewards.
In the United States, in light of the successful but partial reach of the
reward model, it can be predicted that the institutional/structural approach
pursued in more comprehensive ways in Australia is also likely to expand.
In addition, if Congress permits, movement to bolster the legislative
protection that attaches to whistleblowing to the media will likely develop
consistently with First Amendment traditions. Similarly, despite the
existence of the constitutional “reporter’s privilege,” pressure remains for
US journalism “shield laws,” like those in Australia, to be passed—even
though, like previous attempts to amend the WPA, two such reform bills
recently died after four years in development.264
It remains to be seen whether each country is likely to address the
substantial failure of the original anti-retaliation model. The answer in each
country is likely to be different. The nature and scale of the challenges that
confound US employment law are too large to canvas here. However, in
general, the absence of a more regulated approach to industrial relations
likely means that use of anti-retaliation measures as a means of
263
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compensating whistleblowers and changing organizational behavior is
likely to remain an ongoing, piecemeal battle. While regulators such as the
OSC may recently be inclined to engage in this battle with more energy and
effectiveness than previously, at least for the public sector,265 more
substantial questions are likely to remain.
The potential response in Australia, however, is somewhat clearer. It is
now increasingly understood that the decision of most Australian
legislatures to copy the US civil action compensation provisions—rather
than embed compensation provisions in Australia’s existing framework of
industrial relations and employment rights—may not have been the wisest
choice. The relative simplicity with which the United Kingdom was able to
achieve the second of these approaches in 1998 tends to underscore the
misdirected nature of Australian choices to not work with existing
framework. On paper, it should be relatively simple for Australia to rectify
this mistake and also embed the whistleblowing duties and obligations of
employees and employers in its employment law regimes—especially since
consolidation of these regimes since 2006—as indicated by the most recent
law reform proposals.
The primary obstacle to taking this path appears to have been a
conceptual one. As can be seen from the strength of focus on the
structural/institutional and public/media dimensions, whistleblowing
legislation is perceived primarily as a public accountability or opengovernment measure, rather than as a measure also aimed at individual and
organizational justice. As Vaughn notes, however, too strong a focus on
open government inevitably “shows less concern with injury to the
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employment relationship.”266 He writes:
Although the employment relationship generates necessary
information and employment actions may be the principal forms of
retaliation, the open-government perspective is information-based
rather than employment-based. This external focus generates
justifications for protection in the open-government perspective
that are at odds with some of the justifications supporting
whistleblower protection in the employment one.267
This may be why Australian governments appear satisfied if
whistleblowing regimes are succeeding in flushing out information about
wrongdoing and enabling it to be addressed, and have far less regard for the
outcomes for whistleblowers themselves. In both countries, the priority
appears to be a more integrated understanding of the perspectives that
inform whistleblowing laws. Further, this understanding needs to be used to
reinvent compensation provisions that are more tailored, lower-cost, and
adaptive to the unique circumstances and types of damage that flow from
failures in whistleblower support and protection.

V. CONCLUSION
The answer to the question in the title of this article—The Money or the
Media?—is that neither of these important focuses of recent whistleblowing
law reform, in the United States and Australia, respectively, are likely to
prove sufficient in and of themselves. Rather, this article has reviewed key
developments in whistleblowing law reform in each country in order to
arrive at a more coherent and integrated overview of how the general
process of reform might best be approached.
The first part charted the shift in focus from an original anti-retaliation or
266
267
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organizational justice model of whistleblower protection in the United
States, to recent expansion of the reward or bounty model, with some signs
of development in institutional or structural approaches to embedding
whistleblowing in the management and regulatory structures of
organizations. Relatively absent was movement to expand the role of public
or media whistleblowing as an element of the regimes. By contrast, the
second part described the shift in focus in Australia from a similar original
anti-retaliation or organizational justice model, to a major reliance on
institutional or structural approaches, and, most recently, the expanded role
of public or media whistleblowing with no significant development towards
incorporating the reward or bounty model of whistleblowing.
Despite the contrasting choices, the third part of the article discussed the
significance of the fact that the same four distinct legislative models can be
identified at work through these aggregations of laws. The identification of
these approaches aligns with other scholarship to help provide a new
framework for understanding and evaluating the wisdom of legislative
choices to date. Measures that deploy these models, separately or jointly,
can be seen as providing different types of incentives, both to
whistleblowing and to organizational or political responsiveness to
whistleblowing. However, the piecemeal nature of reform choices in both
countries tends to underscore the lack of an agreed understanding among
policymakers of the different dimensions and models and bodies of law
with which they are dealing. When law reform trends in each country are
analyzed, recent activity can be seen to stem not from systematic
acknowledgement of the failure of key approaches, but a resort to
alternative measures with greater assumed effectiveness.
In Australia, the failure of the original anti-retaliation approach and the
need to supplement the institutional/structural approach has led, almost
naturally, to new attempts to try other approaches. Indeed, we find it likely
that the reward approach will also now be taken up, at least in part.
However, in the United States, in light of the successful but necessarily
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partial reach of the reward model, we predict that the institutional/structural
approach long pursued in Australia is also likely to expand.
This begs the question of what reforms are best to be pursued as each
country also returns to the fundamental problem of the substantial failure of
the original anti-retaliation model. As we have shown, each country is
making at least some efforts to address this problem, at least for its federal
public sector, but the problem itself remains very substantial. The ultimate
answer in each country is likely to be different, but the objective remains
the same. Overall, we conclude that legislative efforts that effectively
integrate and reconcile these different approaches provide the most likely
path to greater success in protecting whistleblowers and encouraging
whistleblowing.

VOLUME 11 • ISSUE 2 • 2013

713

